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Founded on good intentions but unrealistic expectations, the dominant
Daubert framework for handling expert and scientific evidence should be
scrapped. Daubert asks judges and jurors to make substantively expert
determinations, a task they are epistemically incompetent to perform as
laypersons. As an alternative, this Article proposes a new framework for
handling expert evidence. It draws from the social and philosophical literature
on expertise and begins with a basic question: How can laypersons make
intelligent decisions about expert topics? From there, it builds its evidentiary
approach, which ultimately results in an inference rule focused on expert
communities. Specifically, when dealing with factual issues involving expertise,
the legal system should not ask factfinders the actual substantive questions, but
instead should reframe its questions to be deferential to the relevant expert
community. To satisfy the requirement of proving causation in a toxic tort case,
the question should not be: Does drug A cause disease X? The more appropriate
question is: Does the scientific community believe that drug A causes disease X?
This deferential approach solves the epistemic competency problem, repairs
many of the unintended structural distortions created by Daubert, and
ultimately reflects a better understanding of science.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1 was
decided in 1993, it has framed nearly every debate about experts in
court and spawned an enormous literature. What constitutes science?
Have judges been imposing the correct standard, and if not, what
factors should they use to determine whether experts are reliable?
Should judges only focus on an expert’s methods, or the conclusions as
well? All of these questions and more—none of which have been (or can
be) easily resolved—are the offspring of Daubert.
But hardly anyone asks the more foundational question: How
does a court—a lay decisionmaker—make intelligent decisions about
expert topics? 2 Daubert assumes that the answer involves judicial
gatekeeping. This assumption is in many ways natural and intuitive.
After all, judges enforce evidentiary rules, and evidentiary rules are
primarily designed to ensure reliable evidence and promote accurate
decisionmaking. If we have concerns about expert evidence, then surely
judges should be the ones who ensure that the expert witnesses are
reliable.
1.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2.
But see Ronald J. Allen & Esfand Nafisi, Daubert and Its Discontents, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
131, 136 (2010) (criticizing reform efforts for tweaking or proposing substantive rules “[r]ather
than dealing directly with the epistemological problem expert testimony poses”); Ronald J. Allen,
Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1160–67 (1994)
(questioning whether the Daubert model of educating juries can really work under the common
law scheme of proof).
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Yet, are Daubert’s assumptions correct? Is gatekeeping indeed
the best way to promote more accurate legal decisions about expert
topics? Neither the jury nor the judge typically knows anything about
the subject of proposed expert testimony—indeed, that is precisely the
reason why the expert is there in the first place. If judges are not
experts, how can they effectively gatekeep? And if juries are not experts,
how can they ultimately decide cases competently? Before we ask how
to do Daubert better, we need to ask whether Daubert was right in the
first place.
In this Article, I argue that the Daubert framework is simply
wrong. Daubert may cohere with ordinary evidentiary practice, but that
traditional structure makes little sense in the expert context. The judge
and the jury, lacking in expertise, are not competent to handle the
questions that the Daubert framework assigns to them. The flurry of
post-Daubert educative efforts—reference manuals, scholarly articles,
workshops, etc.—have improved the situation by providing judges with
rudimentary tools to assist their gatekeeping, but the project is
ultimately doomed to fail. As the social science literature makes clear,
expert competency requires years of immersive experience, and no
amount of primers, short courses, or presentations will close the gap.
If Daubert is a fool’s errand, what are we to do? I argue that
solving the problem of scientific evidence requires a fundamental shift
in the types of questions that the legal system asks on expert topics.
When dealing with expert topics, the legal system should not ask
factfinders the actual substantive questions, but instead should
reframe its questions to be deferential to the relevant expert
community. To satisfy the requirement of proving causation in a toxic
tort case, the question should not be: Does drug A cause disease X? The
more appropriate question is: Does the scientific community believe
that drug A causes disease X?
This framework, which I will refer to as the “Consensus Rule,”
is far superior to our current treatment of questions involving
specialized knowledge. It is more epistemically defensible given the
competency of lay decisionmakers. It promotes more accurate
decisionmaking and reflects a better understanding of science. And
properly implemented, it restores the balance of power between judge
and jury and between trial and appellate courts that the Daubert
framework has deeply distorted. All the while, the proposed regime
retains the system’s adversarial values and a litigant’s ability to call its
own experts.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I details the problems
wrought by the Daubert framework and the reasons why the legal
system went down this mistaken path. Turning over a new leaf, Part II
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goes back to basics, examining the foundational question often
overlooked in discussions about expert evidence: How can a nonexpert
make intelligent decisions about expert topics? As Part II will argue,
the optimal answer is that a nonexpert should defer to the expert
community rather than engage in dilettantism. Part II then applies this
lesson to the legal context, developing the Consensus Rule.
Part III details the many conceptual and structural advantages
of the Consensus Rule. Among other things, it avoids the epistemic
competence problems of Daubert, reflects a better understanding of
science, and fixes the structural distortions created by the Daubert
regime.
Part IV responds to potential objections to the Consensus Rule.
For example, critics may claim that a deferential approach to expert
evidence is illegitimate because it effectively abdicates the court’s role
as an independent factfinder. Or they may argue that the stance is too
conservative vis-à-vis new scientific theories, or too radical a departure
from current legal practice. Part IV argues that deferring to the
scientific community is none of these things. Deferring to superior
knowledge is not only sensible but also inevitable, and pockets of the
law already utilize deference rules. Part IV also discusses the practical
issue of determining consensus and reviews some conventional and
innovative solutions.
Part V offers a few brief implementation examples, showing how
the Consensus Rule would work with regard to causation evidence in
toxic torts, social science evidence, and forensics. The Article then
concludes with some questions for the future.
I. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE PROBLEM
Scientific questions are at the heart of some of the biggest legal
awards and settlements today: Does glyphosate, the pervasive herbicide
that most homeowners know as Roundup, cause non-Hodgkins
lymphoma? 3 Does bisphenol A (“BPA”), a plasticizer once found in water
bottles and other containers, disrupt the endocrine system? 4 Does
Vioxx, the formerly popular arthritis drug, cause heart attacks and

3.
Cases in the glyphosate litigation have yielded verdicts of $80 million, $289 million, and
$2 billion. Patricia Cohen, $2 Billion Verdict Against Monsanto Is Third to Find Roundup Caused
Cancer, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/business/monsantoroundup-cancer-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/M647-JHCN].
4.
Brent A. Bauer, What Is BPA, and What Are the Concerns About BPA?, MAYO CLINIC
(May 14, 2021), https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/nutrition-and-healthy-eating/expertanswers/bpa/faq-20058331 [https://perma.cc/J4TU-RV98].
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strokes? 5 Can the radiation emitted by your smartphone cause brain
cancer? 6 Billions of dollars have turned on these scientific questions
over the last decade. So how the legal system handles scientific evidence
matters a great deal. The relationship, however, between courts and
scientific experts is an uneasy one, frequently filled with complaints,
recriminations, and proposals for reform.
A. Scientific Evidence Past and Present
Scientific evidence has long bedeviled the legal system.
Struggles over experts and their testimony go back at least to the
beginning of the nineteenth century, 7 and many of the reforms proposed
back then are uncannily familiar to ones proposed today. 8
The latest cycle of reform arguably began in the 1980s, when
defendants and the defense bar complained about courts being
hoodwinked by “junk science” in mass tort cases. They accused plaintiff
attorneys of manufacturing toxic tort cases by calling dubious scientific
experts willing to testify to just about anything. Over time, the
accusation of junk science expanded ideologically to include defendants
engaging in similar practices (e.g., the tobacco industry 9), as well as
criticisms about the shaky empirical underpinnings of criminal
forensics. 10
5.
Julie Steenhuysen, Long-Term Study Confirms Vioxx Heart Risks, REUTERS (Oct. 13,
2008, 4:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-stroke-vioxx/long-term-study-confirms-vioxxheart-risks-idUSTRE49C84M20081013 [https://perma.cc/3RMZ-UA3N].
6.
Siddhartha Mukherjee, Do Cellphones Cause Brain Cancer?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 13,
2011),
nytimes.com/2011/04/17/magazine/mag-17cellphones-t.html
[https://perma.cc/VTD74DWT].
Observant readers will likely note that all of these examples involve toxic torts, whereas the
problems of scientific and expert evidence extend well beyond the toxic tort context. This Article’s
primary target is scientific evidence in the toxic tort context, even though the solutions clearly
have broader implications. Applications to other contexts will be largely left to future work.
7.
For a history of scientific expert testimony, see Tal Golan’s excellent book, LAWS OF MEN
AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
(2004).
8.
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1220.
9.
See generally DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON
SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 173 (2008) (explaining how the tobacco industry used its
extensive resources to aggressively challenge the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, which
hindered plaintiffs by driving up the cost of litigation); NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY,
MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM
TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 270 (2010) (noting that one of the so-called scientific experts
in favor of the tobacco industry was actually a retired “solid-state physicist, not a biologist,
oncologist, or physician”).
10. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification
“Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989) (describing the lack of empirical studies on the efficacy
of handwriting expertise).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was, and still is, the watershed moment in this
most recent cycle of debate over scientific and expert evidence.
Doctrinally, Daubert is usually remembered for its multifactor test for
scientific reliability: falsifiability, peer review, error rates and
standards, and general acceptance. 11 But as I and others have argued,
these nonexclusive factors are often more akin to incantation than an
operational requirement. 12 The factors are perhaps applicable and
helpful in the toxic tort context (understandably, given the facts in
Daubert 13) but are often a poor guide in other contexts. Studies have
also shown that legal actors often misunderstand the factors or rely on
other proxies. 14
As such, Daubert’s most enduring legacy is not its multifactor
test, but instead its pronouncement that judges are gatekeepers.
Daubert ended the era in which experts had potentially free reign over
potentially gullible juries. Judges now separate good science from bad
science and allow only the good science to get to the jury. The ensuing
Daubert revolution therefore has taken this gatekeeping function as a
baseline assumption. Reform efforts have focused on either improving
gatekeeping or generating evidence for which gatekeeping would be
simple or largely superfluous. For example, commentators have
proposed using neutral experts or expert panels, constraining the
expert hiring process, or using specialized judges or magistrates. 15
Practical efforts have tried to educate judges about science or provide
reading materials for judges facing scientific questions. 16
What reformers have not asked, however, is whether
gatekeeping—or at least the gatekeeping envisioned by Daubert—is
advisable at all. What reformers have neglected are the assumptions
that underlie the gatekeeping solution itself and whether those
assumptions are reasonable. As we shall see, they are not.
11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993).
12. 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY,
JOSEPH SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 41:10 (2020–2021 ed., 2020).
13. The key question in Daubert was whether the drug Bendectin, used to prevent morning
sickness (hyperemesis) in pregnant women, caused birth defects in their children. Daubert, 509
U.S. at 582–83.
14. Jennifer Leigh Groscup, Judicial Decision Making About Expert Testimony in the
Aftermath of Daubert and Kumho, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCH. PRAC. 57, 63–64 (2004).
15. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 56 (1901) (proposing expert tribunals); James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial,
19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 296–99 (2018) (advocating for the “creation of a new division”
of the federal court system staffed with scientific experts).
16. E.g., Joe S. Cecil, Science Education for Federal Judges, 56 JUDGES’ J., Fall 2017, at 8, 9
(describing various education efforts by the Federal Judicial Center to educate judges in science).
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B. The Problem with Daubert
Consider the typical context in which judges are asked to be
gatekeepers, often called the “battle of the experts.” The plaintiff claims
that a chemical caused his injury, so at a pretrial Daubert hearing, the
plaintiff proffers an expert who will (unsurprisingly) testify that the
chemical can cause the injury. The defendant manufacturer of course
denies that its product can cause such an injury. The defendant thus
proffers an expert who will (again unsurprisingly) testify that the
product does not cause such an injury. There is some back and forth,
and then the judge, acting as gatekeeper, must take the presented
information and decide whose testimony is sufficiently reliable to testify
at trial. Further, assuming the case ultimately goes to trial, the jury,
acting as factfinder, must determine which side the evidence favors.
This procedure, however, is paradoxical. Why has the legal
system permitted the parties to offer experts in the first place? Well, for
the simple reason that neither the judge nor the jury know anything
about the specialized field at the core of the litigation. But if that is the
case, how can the judge or the jury possibly make an intelligent
decision? 17 If the experts disagree, as they inevitably will, what makes
the lay decisionmakers qualified to choose between them?
This “expert paradox” was not lost on Judge Learned Hand, who
described the puzzle over a century ago:
[H]ow can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an experience
confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for such
a task that the expert is necessary at all. 18

Although perhaps the most famous articulation of the paradox, Judge
Hand’s was not the first. Indeed, the basic problem has ancient roots,
dating at least as far back as the philosopher Anacharsis from the sixth
century BCE:
Who is to be the judge of skill? . . . [I]t cannot be the nonexpert, for he does not know what
constitutes skill . . . . 19

In their insightful article attempting to explain an expert’s
theoretical role in litigation, Joseph Miller and Ron Allen identify two

17. Gross, supra note 8, at 1182 (“We call expert witnesses to testify about matters that are
beyond the ordinary understanding of lay people (that is both the major practical justification and
a formal legal requirement for expert testimony), and then we ask lay judges and jurors to judge
their testimony.”).
18. Hand, supra note 15, at 54.
19. DOUGLAS WALTON, APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINION: ARGUMENTS FROM AUTHORITY, at xiii
(1997) (citing Sextus Empiricus who reported Anacharsis of Scythia as posing this classic problem).
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possible paths out of the expert paradox. 20 First, the role of the expert
may be to educate the jury (and the judge) to the point at which the jury
can make its own informed decision. This educative solution breaks the
expert paradox by transforming the jury or judge into a temporary
expert, eliminating the incompetency problem. Second, the role of the
expert may be to provide an opinion to which the jury defers. This
deference solution breaks the paradox by enabling the lay
decisionmaker to avoid making any decision requiring expertise. The
layperson merely needs to determine to whom to defer, a decision that
it may (although perhaps controversially) be competent to make.
Daubert plots primarily an educative path, at least for the judge.
By tasking the judge as a gatekeeper, Daubert expects judges to learn
enough about the underlying science to assess the reliability of an
expert’s testimony and the underlying scientific studies. To be sure,
Daubert incorporates “general acceptance” as one of its factors, but the
framework principally views judges as making independent decisions.
While Daubert itself says little about how the jury solves the
paradox, the legal system as a whole suggests an educative path for the
jury as well. 21 Jury instructions assume jurors are competent to make
independent decisions, and specifically admonish them against
deference based on expertise. Jurors are told to “judge [expert]
testimony in the same way that [they] judge the testimony of any other
witness,” 22 and that they “alone decide how much of a witness’s
testimony to believe, and how much weight it deserves.” 23 As Oklahoma
warns, “You are not required to surrender your own judgment to that
of any person testifying, based on that person’s education, training or
experience.” 24
The structure of legal proof also makes educative presumptions.
We foist questions involving expertise, such as whether a chemical
caused the plaintiff’s disease, whether defendant’s policies had a
20. Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or
Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (1993) (asking whether factfinders are supposed to defer
to or be educated by the expert presented). One might argue that this dichotomy between education
and deference is a false one, because education only occurs with some deference to the expertise of
one’s teacher, and deference only legitimately occurs when one has assessed the merits of the
teacher’s arguments. See, e.g., Adam Perry & Farrah Ahmed, Expertise, Deference, and Giving
Reasons, 2012 PUB. L. 221 (proposing a hybrid approach). Nonetheless, I find Allen and Miller’s
dichotomy useful for separating strategies that emphasize the jury’s independent judgment
(education) versus the expert’s superior knowledge (deference). Whether the dichotomy is in reality
a spectrum (a possibility acknowledged by Allen and Miller) is very much beside the point.
21. Allen & Miller, supra note 20, at 1133 (suggesting that the legal system usually chooses
the education model).
22. 7TH CIR. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.21 (2017).
23. 6TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.03 (2019).
24. OKLA. UNIF. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ch. 13-21 (2d ed. 2020).
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statistically disparate impact on minority groups, or whether
defendant’s behavior harmed competition, directly onto the shoulders
of juries. Only in rare instances are jurors asked to defer to experts,
such as when deciding the standard of care in medical malpractice. And
any review of the sufficiency of evidence assumes both that juries are
directly processing the evidence presented and that judges can
competently assess the inferences made.
The problem with this education model is that it runs counter to
much of the epistemological and social scientific literature surrounding
expertise. For both judges and jurors, the Daubert framework assumes
that given clear explanations, intelligent persons can understand and
learn specialized information and then make educated decisions. While
this may be true over the course of one’s life (or at least educators hope
it to be true), it is emphatically not true given the time constraints
under which the legal system operates. 25 During a legal proceeding,
there is scarcely enough time for lay decisionmakers to acquire a
surface-level understanding of the material, let alone develop the
expertise necessary to make informed judgments.
To be sure, the expertise needed to meaningfully consume
scientific information is not the same expertise needed to produce new
research and advance the field, 26 but it is not something that a
layperson can acquire in some daylong or hourlong crash course. 27
Perhaps juries and judges do not need ten thousand hours, but they
surely need more than ten. 28 Just consider the time spent by students
in higher education acquiring the requisite background knowledge to
even begin navigating their respective fields.
Empirical studies have similarly shown that laypersons have
considerable difficulty assessing technical material. 29 In psychological
25. Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr.
Joiner, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 217, 242 (2001); Allen, supra note 2, at 1160 (“One can easily
imagine cases that would require months of instruction before jurors would be competent to decide
intelligently.”).
26. HARRY COLLINS, ARE WE ALL SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS NOW? 71 (2014) (describing how
“interactional expertise,” the working knowledge of a field necessary to discuss ideas, is not the
same as “contributory expertise,” the knowledge necessary to produce research). Interactional
expertise is the ability to talk about a field without actually being a practitioner, the level of
expertise necessary for journalists and sociologists. HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS,
RETHINKING EXPERTISE 28–32 (2007).
27. E.g., Cecil, supra note 16, at 9 (describing education efforts).
28. As repeat players, judges have more opportunities than jurors to acquire expertise, but
this advantage only applies to the broadest of scientific ideas. With generalized dockets, no specific
issue is likely to repeat itself.
29. Sanja Kutnjak Ivković & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony:
Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 473 (2003) (reporting that
jurors had “more problems with testimony that was technically complex”); Sophia I. Gatowski,
Shirley A. Dobbin, James T. Richardson, Gerald P. Ginsburg, Mara L. Merlino & Veronica Dahir,
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experiments, judges admit expert evidence at the same rate regardless
of the underlying study’s validity. 30 At the same time, mock jurors have
trouble incorporating scientifically sophisticated arguments or
technical criticisms. Jurors can comprehend basic scientific information
and respond to criticisms that are “easily recognizable and understood
by jurors.” 31 However, jurors appear to miss even mildly sophisticated
arguments, such as those about confounders or nonblind testing. 32
These outcomes should really come as no surprise. After all,
understanding technical material requires background and context. As
one juror analogized in a previous study, if one is not a music major,
then information involving clefs and notes is “not going to mean very
much to you and you’re not going to understand much of [what the
expert is] saying.” 33 In his dissent to Daubert, Chief Justice Rehnquist
expressed a similar skepticism, remarking that “I defer to no one in my
confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant
when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its
‘falsifiability,’ and I suspect some of them will be, too.” 34
Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a PostDaubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 453 (2001) (reporting judicial survey that raises
concerns about judges’ ability to assess scientific evidence).
30. Margaret Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence
Quality on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 574, 584 (2000); see also Jacqueline Austin Chorn & Margaret Bull Kovera,
Variations in Reliability and Validity Do Not Influence Judge, Attorney, and Mock Juror Decisions
About Psychological Expert Evidence, 43 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 542, 543 (2019) (concluding upon
review of the literature that “[judges] may lack the skills necessary to detect flaws in research”).
31. Chorn & Kovera, supra note 30, at 555; see also Valerie P. Hans, David H. Kaye, B.
Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley & Stephanie Albertson, Science in the Jury Box: Jurors’
Comprehension of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 60, 69 (2011) (reporting
that jurors understood mitochondrial DNA evidence); Jacqueline L. Austin & Margaret Bull
Kovera, Cross-Examination Educates Jurors About Missing Control Groups in Scientific Evidence,
21 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 252, 261–62 (2015) (observing that jurors incorporated criticisms about
missing control groups).
32. Lora M. Levett & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing Expert Witnesses
for Educating Jurors about Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 363, 370 (2008)
(confounders); Chorn & Kovera, supra note 30, at 556 (nonblind testing); see also Margaret Bull
Kovera, Bradley D. McAuliff & Kellye S. Hebert, Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: Effects of
Juror Gender and Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work Environment Case, 84 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 362, 372 (1999) (observing that “jurors may have relied on heuristic cues[, not
evidence quality,] when evaluating the validity of [expert testimony]”).
33. Ivković & Hans, supra note 29, at 474; see also Haack, supra note 25, at 225 (analogizing
a lay person judging the merits of a scientific claim to an American “asked to judge . . . a crossword
puzzle where . . . the solutions are all in Turkish”).
34. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147–48
(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that gatekeeping “ask[s] judges to make subtle and
sophisticated determinations about scientific methodology and its relation to the conclusions” but
recognizing that “judges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate
the making of such decisions”).
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More hazardous are instances in which laypersons think that
they understand the material but in reality do not. 35 Yes, the nonexpert
can simply read the primary source material. The nonexpert may even
comprehend the words or get the “gist.” But the nonexpert does not
truly understand the results because he lacks context. 36 Without the
backstory, the layperson cannot set his priors correctly, and he may
overvalue individual studies or datapoints, since—to recall an old
evidentiary adage—“a brick is not a wall.” 37
As sociologist Harry Collins has warned, “distance leads to
enchantment.” 38 The farther one is from the point of knowledge
creation, the more certain the conclusions often appear. This is why
media depictions of scientific discoveries make them appear to be more
certain (and more predestined) than they actually are. 39 This is also
why disagreements, particularly in new and unsettled areas of scientific
inquiry, “do not mean that one of the parties is wrong or practicing junk
science or just shilling for one side or outright lying.” 40
Ironically, the structure of legal proof makes the epistemic plight
of lay decisionmakers even worse. Understanding a single stream of
scientific information, presented by a neutral teacher (much like you
would in a college classroom), is already hard enough, as most could
attest. But that supportive environment is not the one in which we ask
legal decisionmakers to learn. Instead, the adversarial system
guarantees warring experts. And to decide between warring experts on
substantive grounds, it stands to reason that the decisionmaker would
actually have to have a higher level of expertise than the disputants
themselves. 41
Multifactor tests or checklists are not the solution either.
Generally speaking, rules can help people with insufficient knowledge

35. J.D. TROUT, WONDROUS TRUTHS: THE IMPROBABLE TRIUMPH OF MODERN SCIENCE 199
(2016).
36. COLLINS, supra note 26, at 94–96; COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 26, at 22–23 (arguing
that primary source knowledge is not much better than oversimplified popular accounts, because
it makes the consumer think that he is in deep in the literature but yet he has no context).
37. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory comm. notes on 1975 proposed rule (citing MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE).
38. COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 26, at 20.
39. Id. at 21 (describing this phenomenon as “narrow[ing] the bandwidth”).
40. MICHAELS, supra note 9, at 165 (criticizing those who think that Daubert “provides [a]
philosophical tool to help judges identify ‘good science’ ”).
41. COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 26, at 63 (arguing that “downward discrimination,” having
the greater expert judge the lesser, is the only reliable arrangement); DAVID COADY, WHAT TO
BELIEVE NOW: APPLYING EPISTEMOLOGY TO CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 34–35 (2012) (arguing that
only an expert can assess other experts).
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navigate difficult questions, 42 but scientific questions involved in
litigation typically defy a paint-by-numbers approach. 43 After all, if
causation, validity, or other hard scientific questions could simply be
resolved through having nonexperts apply some set formula or
algorithm, what need would there be for rigorous scientific education
and training? 44 For this reason, online medical symptom checkers have
rather poor accuracy rates. 45 These questions ultimately boil down to
scientific judgment—perhaps judgments aided by principles or factors,
but judgments just the same. 46 And such scientific judgment requires
expertise. Indeed, the law’s desire to “transmute[ ] scientific subtleties
into formulaic legal shibboleths” 47 both is hypocritical and shows a
profound lack of professional respect for scientists. As lawyers, none of
us think that subtle questions of legal interpretation can be resolved
through mechanistic algorithms applied by laypersons. Then why do we
think that scientific questions can? 48
C. The Costs of Daubert
Having placed its lay decisionmakers in impossible positions,
the Daubert regime dooms itself to suboptimal decisions. And while
42. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).
43. ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS 233 (2007) (arguing that rules are “a fantasy” in
determining the validity of science, so the focus is on principles).
44. Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States,
10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 193 (1997) (noting that Daubert’s assumption that there exists some
algorithm to determine good science is “inconsistent with scientists’ need to undergo lengthy,
specialized training”).
45. See, e.g., Michella G. Hill, Moira Sim & Brennen Mills, The Quality of Diagnosis and
Triage Advice Provided by Free Online Symptom Checkers and Apps in Australia, 212 MED. J.
AUSTL. 514, 518 (2020). Perhaps the artificial intelligence algorithms will improve eventually, but
the point is that medical diagnosis is not a simple rule-based endeavor.
46. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2011) (arguing that
“[n]o algorithm exists for applying the Hill guidelines [for determining causation]” and that “the
use of scientific judgment is necessary” (internal quotation marks omitted)); MICHAELS, supra note
9, at 165 (“The Daubert decision provides no philosophical tool to help judges identify ‘good science,’
nor could it. There is not just one philosophy of science. No absolute criteria exist for assessing the
validity of scientific evidence.”); Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland, Causation and Causal
Inference in Epidemiology, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S144, S150 (2005) (arguing that it is impossible
to reduce determinations of validity or causation to a checklist).
47. SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 98 (2014).
48. For this reason, arguments suggesting that judges can engage in Daubert gatekeeping
because they are trained in critical thinking or analytical reasoning similarly fall short. See
BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 43, at 233 (defending judicial gatekeeping based on judges’ training
in structured reasoning). Perhaps judges are better than jurors because of their training, but that
relative advantage is small consolation.
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critics are quick to blame the decisionmakers, the fault lies not with
them, but with the underlying structure.
Judges, the overwhelming majority of whom are earnest,
responsible, and highly educated, will understandably try hard to equip
themselves with the tools necessary to make these decisions requiring
expertise. They may attend science education seminars and read
educational materials, and veterans will see multiple science-related
cases over their long careers. All of this experience, however, creates a
dangerous psychological trap, for it promotes dilettantism. Armed with
basic but surface-level scientific knowledge, the dilettante knows too
much to defer to others, yet knows too little to make sound decisions. 49
Lawyers (and indeed some would say, law professors especially)
seem to be prone to dilettantism, perhaps because in working on cases
or making arguments we are exposed to many specialized fields and
need to quickly learn and internalize new bodies of knowledge. But
being a smart person capable of acquiring surface-level fluency in a field
leaves one far from actual expertise, and the failure to distinguish the
difference can lead to head-scratching behavior. Take for example
Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 50 in which the U.S Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s exclusion of expert
testimony linking the defendant’s nicotine patch with the plaintiff’s
heart attack for “lack[ing] scientific rigor.” 51 From the standpoint of
Daubert, this outcome is entirely unremarkable, but consider the
characters in this tale. The expert was Dr. Harry Fozzard, a
distinguished professor of medicine and former chief of cardiology at the
University of Chicago, as well as a former editor-in-chief of the journal
Circulation Research. 52 The author of the opinion was Chief Judge
Richard Posner, former professor of law at the University of Chicago
and a founder of the law and economics movement. Judge Posner’s legal
acumen is unquestioned, but the very idea of a law professor assessing
and correcting the opinions of a medical professor on a medical issue is
utterly bizarre. 53 After all, would we ever have Dr. Fozzard assess
49. Tom Nichols, for example, observes that in the vaccine context, it is not the uneducated
who go astray, but rather the people who “are educated just enough to believe they have the
background to challenge established medical science.” TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE:
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS 21 (2017); cf. COLLINS,
supra note 26, at 118 (arguing that laypersons with primary source knowledge are “dangerous”
because they do not actually have expertise, but they think they do).
50. 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996).
51. Id. at 319.
52. Id. at 318; Timothy J. Kamp & Craig T. January, Harry A. Fozzard, MD: 1931-2014, 116
CIRCULATION RSCH. 552, 552–53 (2015).
53. Among other things, Judge Posner criticized Dr. Fozzard’s failure to account for
alternative causal theories and his reliance on animal studies to understand the effects of nicotine.
The opinion also effectively made its own scientific conclusions: “Wearing a nicotine patch for three
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whether Judge Posner correctly applied the requirements of proximate
cause?
Jury decisionmaking fares no better. Jurors who have some
tangential knowledge or who are quick studies and readily absorb the
scientific material will be prone to overconfidence. They are likely to
join the judges in engaging in dilettante decisionmaking. The
remaining jurors are left to their own devices in assessing the warring
experts. Lacking expertise, they must rely on proxies or other measures
of reliability beyond the substantive content of the expert testimony,
skills called “external meta-expertise” in the sociological literature. 54
External meta-expertise basically consists of the everyday
expertise that people use to distinguish liars. 55 In some sense, resorting
to these skills and techniques is both understandable and promising.
Devoid of other options, jurors naturally fall back on techniques that
they both know and are comparatively competent in. The problem,
however, is that those everyday techniques do not transfer well to the
expert context, which is why jurors are mocked for focusing on an
expert’s tie or appearance. Everyday cues and stereotypes, perhaps
half-useful (and even then deplored) in assessing the honesty of a
salesperson or the danger presented by the person lurking at a street
corner, have even less probative value in assessing expert testimony.
Experts, after all, are carefully selected by litigants for their
presentability, and the reliability of expert testimony depends on the
message, not the messenger. 56
The situation improves little even if jurors moved beyond
superficial appearances to more substantive external measures. For
example, suppose jurors focused on the testimony’s clarity and
accessibility. 57 Why should a nonexpert’s ability to understand an
expert conclusion be correlated at all with the conclusion’s reliability? 58
As the philosopher J.D. Trout has argued, the “goodness” of an

days, like smoking for three days, is not going to have a significant long-run effect on coronary
artery disease; that much is clear.” Rosen, 78 F.3d at 319.
54. COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 26, at 45, 51 (discussing external meta-expertise).
55. COLLINS, supra note 26, at 76–79.
56. To be sure, some studies suggest that “both the messenger and the message are important
for a decision about the credibility of an expert witness.” Ivković & Hans, supra note 29, at 458.
The point, however, is even this does not help the jury. Assessing the messenger is an unreliable
way to determine the accuracy of the message, while the jury is incompetent to assess the message
directly.
57. Id. at 479 (discussing “importance of clarity and accessibility”); DAVID H. FREEDMAN,
WRONG: WHY EXPERTS* KEEP FAILING US—AND HOW TO KNOW WHEN NOT TO TRUST THEM 76–80
(2010).
58. See TROUT, supra note 35, at 62 (questioning why we rely so much on our understanding,
when “[o]ur finite minds turn to simple rules to process the myriad things we hope to understand”).
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explanation depends on its accuracy, not our ability to understand it. 59
Indeed, this quest for clarity may in fact hamper jurors in their
decisionmaking. Studies show that nonexperts prefer not only good
explanations, but also confident and seemingly certain ones, even if
they contain false details. 60 By contrast, while experts also prefer good
explanations, they are appropriately more skeptical and less
confident. 61
A natural response to these complaints about judicial
dilettantism or jury reliance on proxies is resignation. What more can
we possibly expect judges and juries to do? Under the current structure,
judges and juries seem to be doing their best given the impossible task
presented to them. But the key word here is current. There is nothing
inherent about the Daubert structure, and it is the structure that
deserves criticism, not the actors working within it. 62
Suboptimal decisionmaking is the chief vice of the Daubert
framework. (After all, accuracy is the framework’s raison d’etre.) But
Daubert has sowed other pathologies in the legal system, as developed
below.
1. Extralegal or Norm-Violating Behavior
By tasking lay decisionmakers with near impossible tasks, the
Daubert framework has encouraged them to seek workarounds,
including ones that are extralegal or violate modern legal norms. In a
sense, the pressure placed by the legal system ultimately seeks a weak
point for its release. Faced with warring experts and desperate for some
tie-breaking information, jurors end up searching the internet, in
violation of the rules against extraneous prejudicial information. 63
Similarly, some judges conduct independent judicial research,
departing from adversarial system norms or even rules against ex parte
communication. 64 These judges justify their departures as necessary for
accurate decisionmaking, and they are right. But the practice clearly
59. Id. at 131. Trout argues that we need to look to “mature science we know to be accurate,
not intuitions regarding what we think is true.” Id. at 198. This approach is precisely the one I
take in this paper.
60. Id. at 40–41 (reporting on neurobabble experiments of Dean Skolnick Weisberg);
FREEDMAN, supra note 57, at 68–69 (suggesting that nonexperts gravitate to the expert expressing
greater certainty).
61. TROUT, supra note 35, at 40–41.
62. As Sam Gross notes in his seminal piece on expert evidence, “it is not true that whatever
a judge or jury does with expert evidence is as good as what anybody else could do.” Gross, supra
note 8, at 1181.
63. See FED. R. EVID. 606.
64. Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263,
1275, 1278 (2007).

2022]

THE CONSENSUS RULE

423

runs counter to party-driven litigation norms, and its rare, inconsistent,
and reluctant use harms uniformity.
Use of court-appointed experts or technical advisors, whether
actual or proposed, represents another departure from adversarial
norms caused by the Daubert framework. One natural way to avoid
dilettante decisionmaking is to have an expert decide, which is precisely
what these mechanisms do. Another related response is for judges to
informally specialize, 65 or for courts to use specialist judges, 66 but these
practices or proposals run afoul of deep-seated norms about generalist
judges (and juries).
A further way of relieving the pressures imposed by impractical
doctrines or policies is for actual practice to simply diverge from them.
Examples abound from everyday life in which overly stringent
regulations are enforced with a light touch, or inane corporate policies
are flouted, circumvented, or complied with in name only. 67 So too with
Daubert, where not only is the gatekeeping task difficult for judges, but
applying the Daubert factors makes little sense in many applied science
contexts. In these contexts, with little choice, judges engage in what is
better characterized as an intuitive “hard look” test than an analytical
application of formal standards. 68
Perhaps the final release valve to the Daubert pressure is
abdication. In a number of high-profile cases, judges have thrown up
their hands, receiving appellate court ire in return. 69 But rather than
scornfully viewing these instances as the result of laziness, perhaps we
should view them as refreshingly honest and humble. That a court

65. Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 554 (2008).
66. See James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 296–99
(2018).
67. For example, consider unrealistic speed limits, or when store clerks use a “house”
frequent-shopper card to help hapless patrons without them.
68. 5 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 41:10.
69. For example, as the trial court stated in McClain v. Metabolife International, Inc.:
Trying to cope in this case without a pharmacological, or a medical, or a chemical, or a
scientific background, the court cannot fully and fairly appreciate and evaluate the
methodology employed by either of these witnesses as they reached the conclusions they
reached, conclusions that a jury could not reach without some expert opinion testimony.
Neither can the court fully appreciate or evaluate the criticisms made by defendant of
the proposed testimony of these witnesses, especially when the criticisms do not come
from competing proposed experts. This court does not pretend to know enough to
formulate a logical basis for a preclusionary order that would necessarily find, as a
matter of law, that these witnesses cannot express to a jury the opinions they
articulated to the court.
401 F.3d 1233, 1238 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005). See also Est. of Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d
457, 464 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that the district court failed multiple times to act as a gatekeeper
for expert testimony).
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“cannot fully and fairly appreciate and evaluate the methodology
employed” by the experts we should have little doubt. 70
2. Overly Simplistic Rules
Despite the fact that checklists really cannot capture the process
of scientific judgment, the pressures of the Daubert framework have
encouraged courts to develop dubious proxies for good science. These
proxies may make the gatekeeping task feasible for lay judges, but they
oversimplify science at considerable cost to accuracy. For example, one
common mistake is to equate statistical significance—traditionally, a pvalue of 0.05—with evidentiary reliability. While historically used as a
rule of thumb, statisticians have now concluded that using the 0.05
threshold is more distortive than helpful. 71 The evidentiary weight due
to a scientific study involves many other factors beyond p-value,
including statistical power, effect size, and data quality, yet p-value has
become almost a magical line in law circles. In addition, even if a 0.05
p-value were an appropriate metric for scientific proof, it does not at all
square easily with legal standards of proof. 72
Other questionable proxies have also arisen as judges have
sought certainty and bright-line rules where none exist. Some courts
have required a relative risk of 2.0 in toxic tort cases, requiring a
doubling of the population risk before considering causation. 73 But the
preponderance standard does not require that the substance more
likely than not caused any case of the disease in the population, it
requires that the substance more likely than not caused the plaintiff’s
case. Other courts have required epidemiological (human) studies in
order to prove causation, even though the entire field of toxicology uses
tissue and animal studies to make inferences, often in combination with
and especially in the absence of epidemiology. 74
An even more insidious simplification has been the atomization
of scientific evidence. Perhaps because the above proxies and the
70. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1238 n.3.
71. Ronald L. Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA Statement on p-Values: Context,
Process, and Purpose, 70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129, 131 (2016).
72. See generally Michelle M. Burtis, Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Error Costs,
Legal Standards of Proof, and Statistical Significance, 25 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2–5 (2017)
(discussing the problematic relationship between statistical significance and legal burdens of
proof).
73. Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using
Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 348–
49 (2000) (discussing an emerging rule requiring epidemiology with greater than double the risk).
74. Id. at 361–62 (recounting neutral expert in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp.
1387, 1449 (D. Or. 1996), who testified that when epidemiology is not clear, toxicology is
appropriate to consider).
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Daubert standard itself are most easily applied to individual studies,
some courts have taken a study-by-study approach to reliability and
have refused to allow experts to consider the scientific literature
holistically. 75 This atomized approach reflects a common mistake made
by lay consumers of science, which is to overly emphasize single studies
and their conclusions. The mere fact that one study finds a link does not
mean the link is established, just as uncertainties or weaknesses in a
study do not render it invalid. 76
Many of these simplifications ultimately harm plaintiffs more
than defendants, and so critics have often argued they are ideological
in origin, as discussed below. That may partially be the case. But one
should also not forget the powerful influence that structure has on
behavior. Daubert gatekeeping places lay judges in an epistemically
difficult position. That they would then develop simplifying doctrines—
however ill-advised or one-sided—is practically inevitable.
3. Politicization
Worst yet, many of the pathologies discussed invite what the law
frequently seeks to avoid most of all—politicization. If checklists do not
work and judges are forced to rely on intuition, then those intuitive
judgments will reflect the inherent biases we all have. If judges can
choose to use (or not use) a multitude of flawed simplifying rules, that
choice enables them to consciously or unconsciously reach their desired
admissibility result. And if juries are epistemically incompetent and
given no effective guidance on how to decide an expert issue, then they
will be prey to emotional or deep-pocket arguments.
The empirical literature and the case law hint that this
politicization is real. Eric Helland’s recent study suggests that a judge’s
demographic and political background has a significant effect on
Daubert decisions. 77 Legal realism of course is not new, but the legal
realist charge is normally primarily aimed at appellate lawmaking. To

75. Margaret A. Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in FED. JUD. CTR.,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 11, 23 (3d ed. 2011) (reporting that some courts are
atomistic, while others are not); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 (1997) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is not intrinsically ‘unscientific’ for experienced
professionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific evidence . . . .”).
76. Cf. Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models, 77 PHIL. SCI.
971, 973 (2010) (noting that while it is true that climate models have some inaccuracies and
uncertainties, “it is generally untrue that the global models cannot represent present or past global
climate”).
77. Eric Helland, The Role of Ideology in Judicial Evaluations of Experts, 62 J.L. & ECON.
579, 609 (2019).
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see strikingly legal realist results at the trial level—the place where the
rule of law has long been thought to operate most strongly—is telling.
The sharp difference in judicial scrutiny of expert evidence in
civil versus criminal cases similarly points to politicization. Stricter
admissibility standards are generally thought beneficial to both
criminal and civil defendants. Yet the strictness of Daubert in the civil
context (thereby helping corporate defendants) is matched only by the
laxness of its application in the criminal (thereby helping prosecutors).
In some states, this political choice is openly made by the legislature (as
in Georgia), 78 but elsewhere, Rule 702 and Daubert are textually transsubstantive, leading to outcries of discriminatory application. 79
D. The Roots of the Daubert Mistake
How did the legal system end up in this mess? As it turns out,
the Daubert framework may be an epistemic mistake, but in many
ways, it is an understandable one. Structurally and culturally, Daubert
was a natural fit for solving the problem of junk science in the court
room. Daubert was in a sense too tempting for the American legal
system to avoid.
1. The Structure of Evidence Law
Two things lie at the core of the American process of legal proof.
One is the focus on admissibility; the other is the obsession with oral
witnesses. The Daubert framework is a symptom of both.
American evidence law consists primarily of admissibility rules,
rules applied by a judge to limit the evidence heard by the jury. 80 The
judge screens the evidence, after which the jury is left largely unbridled.
One can certainly imagine alternatives—for example, more frequent
78. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-707 (2021) (stating that expert evidence in a criminal case
“shall always be admissible”), with GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-702 (2021) (adopting for civil cases a
framework almost identical to Rule 702 and referencing Daubert by name).
79. Valena E. Beety & Jennifer D. Oliva, Evidence on Fire, 97 N.C. L. REV. 483, 489–90 (2019).
80. Historically, the reasons given for this structure include a mix of adversarial values, the
use of witnesses, and a distrust of the jury. Edmund M. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary
Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 258 (1937); see also JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 2 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1898) (“It
is this institution of the jury which accounts for the common-law system of evidence . . . .”). Note,
however, that in modern practice, admissibility rules also govern bench trials, despite the rules’
origins in jury distrust. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 1:3 (4th ed. 2020). Compare In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 164 (3d Cir. 1999) (Becker,
C.J., dissenting) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence apply with full force to bench trials.”), with Null
v. Wainwright, 508 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Strict evidentiary rules of admissibility are
generally relaxed in bench trials, as appellate courts assume that trial judges rely upon properly
admitted and relevant evidence.”).
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judicial comment on the evidence, 81 rules governing inference, or more
rigorous sufficiency standards—but we have chosen to control the jury
using admissibility. Daubert is the offspring of this structure. Just as
judges filter out questionable evidence like hearsay, character, and
emotionally charged photographs, Daubert asks judges to filter out junk
science. But the fundamental problem is not simply bad evidence. The
difficulty is that judges and juries are not qualified to make expert
determinations, so both the gatekeeping and the subsequent factfinding
are fraught.
American trial practice also centers on live witnesses, perhaps
pathologically so. 82 Nearly all evidence enters the trial process through
a witness’s testimony, even when that witness acts as a mere conduit. 83
Consequently, the legal system focuses on the expert witnesses offered
by the parties, rather than the body of knowledge or the scientific
community that underlies them. The battle of experts and its associated
problems come from allowing the individual experts to take center
stage. Since the parties choose from among a nearly limitless pool of
experts, they can always provide the misimpression of parity even when
none actually exists. 84
2. The Death of Expertise
A cultural explanation for the Daubert framework is what Tom
Nichols has termed the “death of expertise” in broader American
society. 85 This phenomenon is the popular belief that laypersons can
make perfectly well-informed decisions on expert topics. 86 In modern
times, it is perhaps driven by the democratization of information
through the internet, but it also has deep historical roots in a populist
distrust of experts. 87
Commentators attribute the death of expertise to a variety of
related cultural beliefs. One thread exalts the independent thinker,
believing that “knowledge that is developed by the knower

81. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS’ TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 4–5 (1935)
(describing how the primary means for guiding jury decisionmaking evolved from judicial comment
to admissibility).
82. See generally Edward K. Cheng & G. Alexander Nunn, Beyond the Witness: Bringing a
Process Perspective to Modern Evidence Law, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1077 (2019).
83. Id. at 1099–1104.
84. Gross, supra note 8, at 1125–28 (discussing adversarial bias problems).
85. NICHOLS, supra note 49, at 3–4.
86. Id. at 5–6.
87. Id. at 6.
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herself/himself is better than knowledge that comes from the outside.” 88
The ideal decisionmaker therefore listens to and understands the
experts, and then synthesizes an independent answer. 89 Another thread
opposes experts as exercising nondemocratic authority. 90 Under this
theory, there are no actual experts—experts are simply elites in the
position of being called experts. 91 Finally, Nichols himself argues that
the death of expertise has its origins in a kind of narcissism, an attempt
to recapture the self-reliance celebrated by Locke 92 and Tocqueville. 93
As historian Richard Hofstadter once illustrated, a modern American
wakes up and neither knows how his kitchen appliances work nor has
the competency to judge the issues in the morning paper. 94 That feeling
of helplessness generates anger and resentment against elites. 95
Whatever the cause, this death of expertise has opened up
considerable gaps in attitudes between the lay public and the scientific
establishment on scientific issues. 96 It also fuels a belief that lay juries
(and lay judges, who ironically are a different kind of elite) can and
should assess scientific issues themselves. But as I will argue at greater
length below, my critique of the Daubert framework is not about “elites”
versus average citizens. 97 Rather, it is the more basic observation that
88. Rainer Bromme, Dorothe Kienhues & Torsten Porsch, Who Knows What and Who Can
We Believe? Epistemological Beliefs Are Beliefs About Knowledge (Mostly) to Be Attained from
Others, in PERSONAL EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE CLASSROOM 163, 168 (Lisa D. Bendixen & Florian C.
Feucht eds., 2010).
89. Id. at 168–71 (describing the conventional ideal of the independent thinker); COLLINS &
EVANS, supra note 26, at 5–6 (describing the folk wisdom that we do not need experts, rather just
good thinking).
90. WALTON, supra note 19, at 1–2; see also Stephen P. Stich & Richard E. Nisbett,
Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning, 47 PHIL. SCI. 188, 201 (1980) (“The cognitive
rebel is, in effect, proclaiming that the reflective equilibrium of socially designated authorities
doesn’t count, and that his own reflective equilibrium is, for the matter at hand, to be preferred.”).
91. COLLINS, supra note 26, at 50.
92. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 71 (Batoche
Books Ltd. 2001) (1690) (“[P]erhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational
and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, in the consideration of things
themselves; and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men’s to find it.”).
93. NICHOLS, supra note 49, at 4, 16–17.
94. Id. at 18 (quoting RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 34
(1963)).
95. Id.
96. CARY FUNK, LEE RAINIE, AARON SMITH, KENNETH OLMSTEAD, MAEVE DUGGAN & DANA
PAGE, PEW RSCH. CTR., PUBLIC AND SCIENTISTS’ VIEWS ON SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 6 (Jan. 2015)
(reporting a fifty-one point difference between general public and scientists on the safety of
genetically modified foods, a thirty-three point gap on evolution, and a thirty-seven point gap on
human-caused climate change).
97. My argument is also emphatically not that the average person cannot become sufficiently
educated over time about an area to make a contribution, or that only special people with fancy
degrees can become experts. See COLLINS, supra note 26, at 42–43 (reporting that lay activists
contributed to AIDS research, but only after they acquired enough knowledge about clinical trials).
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we are all laypersons, at least most of the time. 98 Hofstadter’s
observation is right: the modern world is too complicated for the
Renaissance-man ideal. Reality belies all of these romantic notions of
lay decisionmaking. Experts undergo extensive training to understand
the nuances of their fields, and experts simply have skills and
knowledges that nonexperts do not have. People trained to speak
German, design machinery, or perform complex mathematical
calculations can do so; laypersons cannot. 99
3. Overconfidence of Legal Actors and the Idealization of Science
A final explanation—a more particularized version of the death
of expertise—is the outsized confidence that lawyers have in
themselves. Perhaps it is because lawyers must routinely absorb and
handle diverse sets of material. Perhaps it is because legal argument
requires and trains us to argue even in the absence of subject matter
expertise. Perhaps it is because the legal profession attracts a certain
level of intelligence with an accompanying arrogance. Lawyers think
both that they are quick studies and that their independent nonexpert
conclusions are correct. 100 (Indeed, on this score, law professors are
perhaps the worst offenders of all.) No wonder then that lawyers would
create the Daubert framework, in which the reliability of science, an
area completely outside our expertise, is debated and determined by
lawyers. The jury still ultimately decides, a concession to democratic
traditions, but only after the lawyers (including the judge) have made
things safe.
This overconfidence in lawyers is made still worse by two other
tendencies. The first is the idealization of science, harkening back to
the dilletante problem. To the extent that most lawyers have little
scientific training, they are apt to idealize and oversimply the scientific
process, and convert it to, for example, Daubert’s four doctrinal factors.
Rather, the point is that laypersons in a courtroom situation are incompetent to make expert
decisions, and they simply do not have time to become experts along the way.
98. Bromme et al., supra note 88, at 165 (“Not only children but also adults remain laypersons
throughout their whole lifetime with regard to most topics and domains of knowledge available in
society.”).
99. MICHAEL POLANYI & HARRY PROSCH, MEANING 184–85 (1975) (noting that the “popular
conception of science . . . is a collection of observable facts that anybody can verify for himself,” but
that the layperson is more likely to break the scientific equipment than make a single observation);
see also COLLINS, supra note 26, at 50 (arguing that relational theory—that expertise exists by
position alone—is belied by experience).
100. Along similar lines, lawyers who have trouble understanding the material end up blaming
the experts instead of recognizing their own limitations. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 40,
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2017) (No. 16-1161) (recording Chief Justice Roberts referring to
the social science data in a voting rights case as “gobbledygook”).
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The second is the way that some lawyers view courts almost as a deus
ex machina for society’s most difficult problems. If we ask the Supreme
Court to decide the most controversial and difficult moral questions of
the day, surely a judge and jury can decide whether a drug causes a
disease.
II. THE CONSENSUS APPROACH
Disparaging the current Daubert framework, flawed though it
is, does not advance the discussion, it only sets the stage. If Daubert is
not the solution, what is? After all, the expert paradox in a sense
suggests that the problem is unsolvable.
As this Part will show, the answer to the expert paradox comes
through a two-part realization. The first is a recognition of the
constrained nature of legal proof. The second is the understanding that
to make educated decisions in this context, we must rely on the
expertise of others (though we must exercise care in selecting what
merits our deference). The solution is therefore a subtle yet
fundamental shift in the questions that we ask the legal system when
it comes to facts requiring expertise. The shift avoids the expert
paradox, the problem of epistemic competence, and many of the other
ills that Daubert has wrought.
A. The Fundamental Question
We begin with the foundational question: How should a lay
person, a nonexpert, make decisions about facts involving expert
knowledge like science? This question is undoubtedly a tricky one, for
it directly implicates the expert paradox as stated by Anacharsis and
Learned Hand. How is a layperson supposed to judge specialized
information when the layperson by definition knows nothing about the
field?
Incidentally, this question is highly general and extends far
beyond the legal context. It applies whenever any layperson interacts
with an expert, such as for medical treatment, financial advice, or home
repairs. 101 It should therefore interest everyone, not just evidence
scholars. Regardless, for our purposes, it is the key prior question.
Without answering it, we cannot even hope to propose a way for the
legal system to handle scientific evidence.
To answer the foundational question, we have to sharpen it by
making clear a few assumptions, most of which are implicit in its
101. Gross, supra note 8, at 1182.
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language. First, we will assume that the goal is accurate
decisionmaking. One can imagine other values to optimize—respect for
individuals, the opportunity to be heard, risk aversion, etc.—but we will
ignore those. The goal is to find the strategy with the highest probability
of determining the factual truth.
Second, the question’s scope is restricted only to factual
determinations. It is not about general decisionmaking, much of which
may involve value judgments or other external considerations. 102 Thus,
our focus is only on finding an optimal strategy for determining
empirical issues such as whether a chemical causes a disease or
whether a manufacturer could have known about a causal link given
extant data. Issues such as whether the manufacturer acted negligently
or should have conducted more testing are beyond the scope of inquiry.
These more value-laden questions involving policy trade-offs and
morality are assumed to be within the competency of a lay
decisionmaker and not areas where experts have specialized
knowledge. 103
Finally, we must remember the context. 104 The foundational
question is asked in a heavily time- and resource-constrained
environment. This constraint is certainly true in the legal context,
where courts must decide cases in finite time, with limited resources,
and often based only on the information presented by the parties. But
the constraint is also frequently true in everyday decisionmaking.
Normally, we cannot wait and see how the scientific evidence develops,
nor can we go to medical school or get PhDs to get the knowledge and
training necessary to become experts ourselves. 105 This constraint is
critical. The legal system is a practical endeavor. Its task is to make the
best decision based on the available evidence, not to be an oracle for

102. Cf. John Hardwig, Epistemic Dependence, 82 J. PHIL. 335, 336 (1985) (restricting
discussion on expertise to propositions for which evidence does actually exist).
103. For example, the question whether to do animal testing has an expert part (whether there
are scientific benefits to the practice) and a nonexpert part (whether it is ethical). Ilya Somin,
When Should Voters Defer to the Views of Scientists?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 3,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/03/when-shouldvoters-defer-to-the-views-of-scientists/
[https://perma.cc/N9XV-5QZ7]
(“[S]ome
seemingly
scientific policy issues actually include major nontechnical components on which scientists are not
likely to have specialized knowledge.”); see also WALTON, supra note 19, at 25 (criticizing when
experts wade into areas that they are not supposed to, such as those involving moral judgment).
104. Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science
Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 814 (noting that the field
of social epistemology asks, “under the real-world epistemic limits of a particular social process for
the acquisition of knowledge, what epistemic norms actually work the best?”).
105. Hand, supra note 15, at 55 (“The jury . . . cannot get [the expertise] mediately, because
the real acquisition of such experience involves a whole course of reading and practical experiment
in the matter in hand, even to understand the terms or the methods of reaching conclusions.”).
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absolute truth. 106 Criticizing past decisions based on evidence that did
not exist at the time of decision is the worst form of Monday-morning
quarterbacking.
Given these constraints, how do we answer the foundational
question? As Section I.B. has already enumerated, the wrong answer is
for the layperson to make an independent judgment. The layperson is
epistemically incompetent to judge the expert opinion substantively
and has neither the time nor the resources to gain such expertise.
Checklists or other proxies such as clarity of presentation are similarly
ineffective. So, we must therefore dispense with the romantic ideal of
the independent decisionmaker or the self-reliant thinker. 107 Instead,
we need to get comfortable with relying on the expertise and authority
of others. Put differently, using the Miller & Allen dichotomy,
laypersons need to start embracing deference over education.
If anything, division of labor, specialization, and expertise
characterize modern postindustrial societies. At best, a person can
master a few subdisciplines, often related to his or her profession or
avocation, but no one can be a polymath. 108 The finitude of time,
resources, and human capability make it impossible for us to have
expertise in all fields. 109 Even without the complexity of modern society,
most of our knowledge comes not from direct observation or proof, 110 but
from the authority of others who know more, and this statement applies

106. Sheila Jasanoff, Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1723, 1730 (2015) (arguing that production of “ ‘good enough’ knowledge has long been a
preoccupation of the law in contemporary societies”). The same constraints apply in clinical
medicine. As Dr. Greenlick, one of the experts in the silicone breast implant litigation, noted:
Physicians [must] do the best they can in an uncertain situation. They use all of the
sources of information at their disposal . . . . The scientist has the luxury of reporting
that there isn’t yet sufficient data to draw a conclusion. That luxury isn’t available to
the clinician, because the decision to do nothing in a clinical situation is selecting a
specific course of action.
Finley, supra note 73, at 361–62.
107. See supra Section I.D.2.
108. Bromme et al., supra note 88, at 165 (“[T]o be a true polymath seems impossible in our
times . . . .”).
109. Dillon, supra note 66, at 311.
110. COADY, supra note 41, at 32:
Many of the things we take ourselves to know with a very high degree of certainty have
not come from drinking “the fountain” of “things themselves,” but rather from our
attending to the thoughts and understandings of other men and women, transmitted to
us (directly or indirectly) through their testimony;
Hardwig, supra note 102, at 335:
The list of things I believe, though I have no evidence for the truth of them, is, if not
infinite, virtually endless. . . . Though I can readily imagine what I would have to do to
obtain the evidence that would support any one of my beliefs, I cannot imagine being
able to do this for all of my beliefs. . . . [I]ntellect is too small and life too short.
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even to the experts themselves. 111 As the philosopher C. A. J. Coady
writes in his seminal book on testimony:
A lot of recent work in epistemology has emphasized the extent to which we are all (albeit
in different ways and to different degrees) epistemically dependent on experts. . . . [W]e
are dependent on others, especially experts or those we judge to be experts, for many of
the things we believe and many of the things we claim to know[,] . . . and we are becoming
more and more reliant on them as our body of knowledge . . . expands[.] 112

Practically speaking then, “[a]n attempt at epistemic selfreliance—even by the experts within their own fields of expertise—
would be sheer folly.” 113 Deference to authority is not laziness or an
abdication of our intellectual responsibility. It is the normatively
correct and rational thing to do, 114 and laypersons do it all the time to
their considerable benefit. 115 As Stephen Stich and Richard Nisbett
argue:
[I]t is a hallmark of an educated and reflective person that he recognizes, consults and
defers to authority on a wide range of topics. . . . Few educated laypersons would consider
questioning the consensus of authorities on the authenticity of a painting, the cause of an
airline crash, or the validity of a new theorem. . . . The man who persists in believing that
his theorem is valid, despite the dissent of leading mathematicians, is a fool. The man
who acts on his belief that a treatment, disparaged by medical experts, will cure his child’s
leukemia, is worse than a fool. 116

111. POLANYI & PROSCH, supra note 99, at 185 (“[In addition, scientists themselves] must rely
heavily for their facts on the authority they acknowledge their fellow scientists to have.”).
112. COADY, supra note 41, at 27–28; C. A. J. COADY, TESTIMONY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 282
(1992) (“Clearly, I cannot determine the matter directly, in the sense of checking for myself on the
truth of the information about physics which he gives me, for that would require that I too be an
expert physicist.”).
113. John Hardwig, Toward an Ethics of Expertise, in PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 83, 85 (Daniel E. Wueste ed., 1994). Tony Ward argues that such strong deference
to authority is inappropriate in contexts when “the beliefs adopted from the expert have to be
publicly justified,” such as the legal context. Tony Ward, Expert Testimony, Law and Epistemic
Authority, 34 J. APPLIED PHIL. 263, 265 (2017). In a sense, Ward argues that an accurate decision
is not enough, but rather that the factfinder must have justified belief in the fact. Id. at 266–67.
Given the epistemic incompetence of the lay decisionmaker in this context, however, I would argue
that accuracy is the best we can do.
114. Hardwig, supra note 102, at 343 (“[R]ationality sometimes consists in deferring to
epistemic authority . . . .”); Stich & Nisbett, supra note 90, at 199 (“Deference to authority is not
merely the habitual practice of educated people, it is, generally, the right thing to do, from a
normative point of view.”).
115. Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway observe that while we do not trust an expert to select
our home (because it is a subjective nonfactual inquiry), we trust title searches. Why? “The short
answer is because we don’t have much choice. Someone has to do the title search, and we do not
have the expertise to do it ourselves. We trust someone who is trained, licensed, and experienced
to do it for us.” ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 9, at 272; WALTON, supra note 19, at 24
(“[D]eference to experts is woven into even the homeliest routines of everyday life.” (quoting THE
AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY 9 (Thomas L. Haskell ed., 1984))).
116. Stich & Nisbett, supra note 90, at 198–99; see also COADY, supra note 41, at 33 (“Surely
most of us would (and should) prefer the predictions of meteorologists to inductions from our own
experiences, when trying to work out what tomorrow’s weather will be like.”).
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Can the experts be wrong? Of course. The reason why we should
listen to the experts is not that they are infallible, but rather that they
are more likely to be right than we. 117 And given the resource- and timeconstrained contexts in which laypersons must make their decisions,
deference is not merely optimal—it is the only practical strategy. 118 We
trust experts all the time, and “for the most part, the trust [in experts]
seems to work out.” 119
Now, I should be precise about exactly what this deference
entails and to whom laypersons should defer. Deference is due neither
to any random person claiming to be an expert, nor to someone merely
sporting the right credentials. In fact, deference is arguably not due to
any individual at all! Individual experts can be incompetent, biased,
error prone, or fickle—their personal judgments are not and have never
been the source of reliability. Rather, proper deference is to the
community of experts, all of the people who have spent their careers
and considerable talents accumulating knowledge in their field. 120 If an
individual expert is given our deference, it is only because they
represent or provide evidence of what their community would say. The
source of reliability is not the person, but the community behind him or
her. To refer back to the language of Stich & Nisbett, we accept the
authenticity of the painting or the validity of a theorem because that is
what “the consensus of authorities” has concluded, not because of a
single expert’s personal say-so. 121
This deference does not absolve the layperson of all
responsibility. Most of the time, the best evidence of the scientific
community’s judgment will come from individual experts. The
layperson retains the duty to determine when an individual expert is
accurately reporting or representing that consensus. This subtle point
is worth restating. The layperson uses his judgment not to determine
the substantive answer to the scientific question, but rather to
determine what the community consensus thinks it is. The perspective
shift is critical, for the latter determination involves no expert

117. COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 26, at 2.
118. ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 9, at 272 (“So it comes to this: we must trust our scientific
experts on matters of science, because there isn’t a workable alternative.”).
119. DANIEL T. WILLINGHAM, WHEN CAN YOU TRUST THE EXPERTS?: HOW TO TELL GOOD
SCIENCE FROM BAD IN EDUCATION 178 (2012); NICHOLS, supra note 49, at 23 (arguing that experts
are more often right than wrong).
120. WALTON, supra note 19, at 38 (suggesting that Aristotle’s strategy would be to ask
“whatever most of [the experts] or what all of them would choose”).
121. Stich & Nisbett, supra note 90, at 198–99.
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judgment. The layperson is perfectly competent to perform it, and there
is no expert paradox. 122
Finally, just as the foundational question is limited to factual
questions, so too must the layperson be careful not to defer to experts
on policy or value judgments. 123 The layperson owes deference to the
expert community on factual questions because of its expertise, but its
expertise does not extend to moral or ethical questions. 124 In fact, the
layperson retains the civic duty—particularly in her democratic roles
as a juror, voter, or participant in public discourse—to exercise
independent judgment on value-laden questions. 125 So, for example, on
the issue of human-caused climate change, the scientists determine
whether it exists. The citizenry determines whether the costs of
preventing it are worth the benefits.
B. The Consensus Rule in Law
Operationalizing a deferential approach in the legal system
poses a tricky problem. The needed reform is not strictly evidentiary—
at least not in the conventional sense of involving a tweak to the
admissibility rules. In fact, maybe this is why the legal system has been
stuck in a quagmire for so long. A deferential approach demands a more
fundamental change to the factfinding process, and depending on one’s
perspective, an adjustment in the underlying substantive law.
The most direct method to implement this deferential approach
is through substantive amendment. For example, in products liability
law, plaintiffs currently must show that the product defect caused the
plaintiff’s harm. Since this causation requirement typically requires
scientific knowledge, we could change the substantive requirement to
require that the scientific community believes that the product defect
caused the harm.
122. Walton suggests that this distinction goes back to Plato. WALTON, supra note 19 at 37–
38 (suggesting that while Plato in Charmides argued that the layperson could not assess
specialized knowledge, the layperson could assess whether the expert’s report was “something that
is known to be true, or is accepted in a field of expert knowledge”).
123. Id. at 25 (arguing that experts sometimes wade into areas that they are not supposed to,
such as moral judgments); see also Larry Lengbeyer, Assoc. Professor of Phil., U.S. Naval Acad.,
Presentation at the 6th Biennial Conference of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice:
Defending Limited Non-Deference to Science Experts (June 17, 2016) (offering instances in which
nondeference to experts may be appropriate).
124. See, e.g., Susanne M. Schmittat & Pascal Burgmer, Lay Beliefs in Moral Expertise, 33
PHIL. PSYCH. 283, 286–88 (2020) (reviewing literature expressing doubts over whether moral
expertise exists or can exist).
125. See Jasanoff, supra note 106, at 1742 (warning that “a strong scientific consensus may
dilute the need to scrutinize scientific claims, but it is not an invitation for the law to abdicate its
normative responsibilities”).
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Direct substantive amendments, however, are problematic for
several reasons. First, simply adding a scientific consensus requirement
would place a new and significant burden on plaintiffs, for if no
consensus exists, then plaintiffs would lose. Some tort reformers may
find this result appealing as a matter of policy, but our goal here is only
to solve the expert paradox, not to engage in broader tort reform. To
maintain the same balance, we need to require deference to a consensus
if it exists, not flatly require a consensus.
Second, direct substantive amendments are a rather clumsy,
piecemeal approach. Causation in toxic torts is undoubtedly a key area
involving scientific evidence, but the expert evidence problem is transsubstantive, and implementing reform one doctrine at a time is tedious
and inelegant.
Finally, direct substantive amendments are unavailable for
most instances of the expert paradox. Specialized facts are usually part
of a broader evidentiary determination; they are rarely explicit
elements of a claim. The forensic evidence in a criminal case involves
specialized knowledge, but it is only part of the prosecution’s proof that
the defendant committed the crime. Additionally, a mixed question of
law and fact may involve a combination of facts and value judgments,
making deference to the scientific community on the entire element
inappropriate.
What we would like to have is a broader, trans-substantive
reform that only defers to consensus when it exists and relates to a
factual issue. One way to achieve this is with a rule of inference, which
might look something like:
Rule 702A. If the relevant scientific community believes a fact involving specialized
knowledge, then that fact is established accordingly.

If such a provision (which we will label the “Consensus Rule”)
seems unorthodox, it should. In particular, the Consensus Rule may
appear to dangerously infringe on the right to a jury trial, because it
seemingly strips the jury of the power to determine scientific facts.
Ultimately, I will argue that the inference rule is perfectly valid and
indeed shares characteristics with several well-known and wellaccepted evidentiary mechanisms. It departs, however, from most
evidentiary provisions in use, and it raises some unresolved
constitutional issues. We will explore these complexities, advantages,
and potential disadvantages below.
Even if instructed, will jurors follow the Consensus Rule? After
all, the death of expertise and the American distrust of experts run
deep. Despite the cultural issues, one suspects jurors will follow such
rules for a number of reasons. First, jurors are performing a specific role
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in an otherwise unfamiliar environment. The questions we ask jurors
define their role, and they are unlikely to unilaterally redefine or
expand that role. Second, the deferential question is simply easier to
answer. Given the difficulty of the material and their limited time and
resources, juries are highly unlikely to make their task harder than it
already is. So even if a juror normally distrusts experts, the juror may
obey the Consensus Rule at trial. 126
What happens if there is no consensus? After all, while expert
communities have vast bodies of shared knowledge, there will always
be controversial or undeveloped areas. 127 In these cases, the Consensus
Rule leaves the legal system right back where it started, with the jury
deciding the expert question. But this outcome should not trouble us. If
the expert community is divided, then the legal system cannot do much
better than a coin flip anyway. To improve overall accuracy, the legal
system might perhaps be wise to develop procedural mechanisms to
delay its decisions until the expert community can reach greater
agreement, 128 but under conventional time constraints, little can be
done.
Even without a consensus, the situation under the Consensus
Rule is still arguably an improvement over the Daubert framework. If
there are developed schools of thought, the spirit of the Consensus Rule
suggests that the jury should only defer to one of those schools, not
strike off on its own. (After all, the jury does not have any expertise to
develop its own theory. 129) Only if the issue is entirely undeveloped
should the jury truly decide the facts for itself. 130
C. Differences from Frye
A natural question is how the Consensus Rule differs from the
Frye standard. Frye has similar language, asking about general
126. Cf. N. J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect: The Impact of Judges’
Admissibility Decisions on the Persuasiveness of Expert Testimony, 15 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1,
12 (2009) (observing that mock jurors were less skeptical of expert evidence within the trial context
than without, possibly because of the implicit impression of approval given by the court).
127. E.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1448 (D. Or. 1996) (reporting
epidemiologist stating that the “different positions [in the case were] the result of different, but
legitimate, interpretations”); COLLINS, supra note 26, at 36 (“Even in the hardest of sciences, one
can find the equivalent of religious schisms.”).
128. Edward K. Cheng, Changing Scientific Evidence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 315, 340–41 (2003).
129. See Anthony J. Casey & Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1203, 1210 (2015) (making this point in complex valuation cases).
130. In the absence of any expert community view, the question may revert to the jury, but
the conventional safeguards remain. For example, if the offered theory has no empirical basis, the
judge can exclude it under the conditional relevance rule, because no reasonable juror could find
the conditional facts. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
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acceptance in the relevant expert community. 131 Frye also defers to the
judgment of experts rather than rely on judicial gatekeeping. 132 One can
thus easily conflate the Consensus Rule with a return to Frye, but
nothing could be further from the truth. The differences are at times
subtle, but they are essential to the Consensus Rule’s success in solving
the expert paradox and achieving more accurate and epistemically
justified decisions. Here is a summary of the major differences, though
a full exposition of their advantages is left to Part III.
1. Admissibility Versus Inference Rule
Frye is an admissibility rule. The judge determines what is
generally accepted, and then uses that determination to screen expert
testimony from the jury’s consideration. Under Frye, the jury still
independently determines the scientific fact. Frye can obviously
influence the jury’s decision, since the jury cannot use evidence that it
does not hear, but the jury remains free to disregard admitted expert
testimony. The jury also receives no guidance should the judge decide
that two warring experts have applied generally accepted techniques.
Contrast that structure to the Consensus Rule, in which the jury (not
judge) determines what is generally accepted, and then the jury defers
to that consensus.
2. Expert Versus Community
Under Frye, the focus is on individual expert witnesses, as it
conventionally is. The judge may use the community’s judgment to
ascertain the reliability of the expert and his methods, but upon
admission, the source of information used by the jury is the individual
expert. Compared to community judgments, individual judgments carry
higher risks of bias, random variation, and incompetency.
The Consensus Rule by contrast shifts the focus away from
individual experts to the underlying expert community. To be sure, the
parties will present individual experts to testify as to what the scientific
consensus is, but the focus is on the community. Furthermore, if those
experts should disagree about the community view, that disagreement
is within the jury’s epistemic competence to resolve.

131. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
132. See Zimmerman v. Powell, 684 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Neb. 2004) (“[T]he Frye framework relies
exclusively on the assessment of the testifying expert’s field; the Daubert . . . framework relies on
the trial court.”); Allen & Miller, supra note 20, at 1141 (tying deference with Frye).
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3. Methods Versus Facts
Although the language of the Frye opinion is broader, 133 courts
have traditionally applied Frye primarily to techniques and methods. 134
Indeed, traditionally, Frye was applied only to novel scientific
techniques in the criminal context. This focus on methods accords with
a framework centered on individual experts, for once the expert is
reliable, then the testimony is for the jury. The Consensus Rule is not
about the reliability of individual experts or their methods. Its focus is
on the actual facts—does the expert community think that a certain
scientific fact is true?
4. Uncertainty
Frye and the Consensus Rule take fundamentally different
stances on uncertainty and scientific disagreement. Frye requires
general acceptance for admission, meaning that expert evidence is
excluded unless the scientific community broadly agrees with it. This
position is highly biased in favor of the status quo, making it a favorite
among (pro-defense) tort reformers, since a robust Frye standard would
impose formidable obstacles on plaintiffs. 135 As one judge has
eloquently argued, however, “[s]ociety need not tolerate homicide until
there develops a body of medical literature about some particular lethal
agent.” 136
The Consensus Rule handles scientific disagreement more
evenhandedly. The rule causes juries to follow the scientific consensus
if it exists. A lack of agreement does not end litigation in favor of the
defendant. (That result would be justified only if there were a scientific
consensus in the defendant’s favor.) A divided expert community just
leaves us with the current regime in which the jury is guessing at the
answer.
*
*
*

133. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (requiring that “the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance”).
134. David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General
Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 392–93 (2001) (noting that Frye was not applied in a civil
case until 1988, and that Frye jurisdictions at the time applied the test to methodology and
reasoning). Daubert made a similar distinction, focusing on methods rather than conclusions, until
the Supreme Court thought better of it. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
135. See MICHAELS, supra note 9, at 170 (“[S]cientific ignorance guarantees legal bliss for
corporations. This is not right. This is not justice.”).
136. Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (Mann, J., concurring); see
also Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1223 n.202 (1980).
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Finally, we should also distinguish the Consensus Rule from the
Frye-centric approach of Peter Huber. Huber, who coined the term “junk
science” and was a key motivator of the Daubert revolution, refers often
to scientific consensus in his writings. 137 To the extent that his views
extol “mainstream scientific consensus,” 138 they accord with the
Consensus Rule. Huber’s project, however, is different than our project
here. His chief target is the historical use of expert credentials as the
primary check on reliability. 139 His response is essentially greater
gatekeeping: encouraging courts to review scientific studies for
soundness, 140 and then trusting judges to screen out junk science. 141 His
tacit assumption is also that juries will ultimately decide the cases
independently with the screened expert evidence. None of those
features address the concerns about the epistemic competence of legal
actors. Huber also seemingly follows Frye’s overly conservative position
on controversial or uncertain issues. 142
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONSENSUS RULE
Although the Consensus Rule requires some rethinking of the
traditional, admissibility-focused structure of evidence law, this Part
argues that it offers an elegant solution to the expert paradox. The
Consensus Rule solves the epistemic problems of Daubert, represents
science more accurately, and eliminates the distortions created by the
Daubert regime.
A. Epistemic Competence
The Consensus Rule is an epistemically superior framework to
Daubert. As we discussed in Part I, Daubert is fundamentally flawed

137. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 194 (1993)
(“Science as Consensus”); Allen & Miller, supra note 20, at 1142 (characterizing Huber as arguing
that scientific consensus is “less fallible”).
138. HUBER, supra note 137, at 199–200; see also Bernstein, supra note 134, at 392
(interpreting Huber as advocating deference to mainstream scientific opinion).
139. HUBER, supra note 137, at 199 (arguing that the wisdom of Frye was to focus on consensus
and away from credentials).
140. Id. at 200 (arguing that a new epidemiological study should survive Frye because the
underlying method is generally accepted).
141. Allen & Miller, supra note 20, at 1144.
142. WALTON, supra note 19, at 193 (criticizing Huber’s approach as “tilting the balance”
excessively in the other direction, leaving “the courts ill-equipped to deal with new technology, or
generally with the kinds of cases where the community of scientists disagree”).
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because it tasks lay actors with making expert judgments. 143 That task
is entirely at odds with the scholarship on expert decisionmaking.
Proposals to educate judges or use court-appointed witnesses really
only mask the symptoms because the lay factfinder still lacks the
competence to make expert judgments.
The Consensus Rule gets judges and juries out of the business of
making substantive scientific judgments. The strategy never asks
laypersons to be dilettantes. Instead, nonexperts are asked to discern
what the expert community thinks is the right answer. 144 This question
is not necessarily a simple one, but it is at least one that lay
decisionmakers are competent to determine through testimony and
other evidence.
B. A Better Understanding of Science
The Consensus Rule also reflects a more realistic and less
caricatured understanding of scientific research. Too often,
nonscientists view “science” as some high school science exams
unfortunately do—a set of memorized truths that are completely
objective and absolutely certain. 145 Those under this delusion often
think that if they could just get an unsullied, neutral expert, they could
finally have access to that objective knowledge. Or if a scientist could
conduct an impeccable study, they would have “the answer.”
All of these notions, including the notion of “junk science” itself,
are wild oversimplifications of the scientific process. 146 To be sure, in
the extreme, charlatans positing theories lacking any empirical basis
are peddling junk. But just because scientists disagree or publish
conflicting studies does not mean that some of them are producing “good
science” and the others junk.
Daubert encourages courts to adopt these oversimplifications by
asking gatekeepers to admit the good and exclude the junk. The
143. MICHAELS, supra note 9, at 166 (“[W]hen judges who are acting as Daubert gatekeepers
declare that isolated studies or particular experts are not reliable, they are making absolute
judgments about the quality of the science, a role for which they are not qualified.”).
144. Cf. COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 26, at 139 (arguing that in the absence of specialized
knowledge, a citizen can make scientific judgments only by relying on others with such knowledge).
145. ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 9, at 267–68. As Oreskes and Conway further note:
This view—that science could provide certainty—is an old one, but it was most clearly
articulated by the late-nineteenth-century positivists, who held out a dream of
“positive” knowledge—in the familiar sense of absolutely, positively true. But if we have
learned anything since then, it is that the positivist dream was exactly that: a dream.
Id.
146. See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF
SCIENCE IN THE LAW 61–62 (2006) (criticizing the overuse of the term “junk science”).
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Consensus Approach does not. By focusing on what the scientific
community thinks, the Consensus Approach searches for scientific
knowledge differently in two important ways. It focuses on community
rather than individuals, and it values holistic scientific judgment over
discrete studies.
1. Community
“[S]cience is a communal practice.” 147 History may exalt and
memorialize the heroes who make extraordinary breakthroughs, but
the everyday process of scientific knowledge production is communal
and institutional. 148 The various processes of education, publication,
conferences, and tenure review all point to “a collective process . . . that
shape[s] and check[s] individual judgment.” 149 So when the Consensus
Rule focuses on the scientific community rather than individual
experts, it more faithfully captures the underlying process.
More importantly for the legal system, the focus on community
helps a lay factfinder make better decisions. 150 Deferring to the expert
community on an empirical question has a greater chance of finding the
truth than deferring to any individual expert. 151 Individual experts vary
in quality and harbor various personal biases. Worse yet, in an
adversarial system, the parties are almost guaranteed to choose experts
at the extremes, rather than provide a representative sample. 152
Focusing on the community instead aggregates and averages the

147. Stephen P. Norris, Learning to Live with Scientific Expertise: Toward a Theory of
Intellectual Communalism for Guiding Science Teaching, 79 SCI. EDUC. 201, 201 (1995); COADY,
supra note 112, at 282–83; see also Norris, supra, at 203 (crediting Polanyi as “the first to argue
that science is a practice conducted by a community of scientists”).
148. ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 9, at 268–69 (noting that, while people equate science
with individual scientists like Galileo, science is really about institutions).
149. Leiter, supra note 104, at 808 (quoting Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in
Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1995)); Schwartz, supra note 44, at 194–95.
150. Norris, supra note 147, at 210–11 (“Epistemic authority . . . does not reside within one
individual, but, rather, rests with communities of experts. ”).
151. Parts of the science studies literature go so far as to suggest that truth provided by science
is “what the relevant community of scientists or technical experts deems to be true.” Jasanoff,
supra note 106, at 1728; see also ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 9, at 268 (“[Science] does not
provide proof. It only provides the consensus of experts, based on the organized accumulation and
scrutiny of evidence.”). But one need not subscribe entirely to this social view to still conclude that
the optimal strategy is to follow the community consensus. Assuming an objective truth, what
institution has a better chance of finding it than the expert community?
152. David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the
Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 453–57 (2008) (discussing the problem of “adversarial
bias”); Gross, supra note 8, at 1181 (discussing how pre-selection ends up obscuring any consensus
among the experts, and how often “many disputes over expert evidence . . . are generated by the
legal system itself”).
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opinions of many experts. 153 From a statistical perspective, it estimates
the mean or mode of the distribution, rather than sampling from the
extremes.
The focus on community also addresses the expert paradox. This
occurs because of the change in question. A lay factfinder lacks the
expertise to substantively choose between expert positions. 154 A lay
factfinder, however, does possess the competency to choose between
experts when they are reporting what the scientific community thinks,
a factual inquiry that does not require scientific judgment.
2. Holistic Assessment
The Daubert framework and its focus on admissibility encourage
courts to view scientific evidence atomistically. For example, courts
often spend considerable energy trying to determine whether the
studies cited by an expert are sufficiently “scientific.” 155 To be sure, the
doctrine is supposed to be about the reliability of the expert’s opinion,
but in practice, Daubert analyses often focus on the individual
studies. 156
Rarely will there be a single study that points inexorably to the
truth. The goal of the proof process therefore should not be to discover
which pieces of evidence are “more scientific” or “better” than the rest.
The goal is to reach an accurate conclusion, and that requires a holistic
evaluation of the body of evidence holistically, just like in nonscientific
factfinding. Setting high bars on individual pieces of evidence just runs
the risk of creating false negative errors.

153. One objection is that by looking at a broader community, we do not necessarily ask the
“best” experts available. Research has suggested, however, that “a random group of intelligent
problem solvers will outperform a group of the best problem solvers.” Lu Hong & Scott E. Page,
Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 16385, 16389 (2004).
154. Allen & Miller, supra note 20, at 1144 (“If jurors cannot comprehend the relevant
material, neither, one would think, would they be able to decide intelligently to which expert to
defer.”).
155. But see Schwartz, supra note 44, at 196 (arguing that there is no “extra-scientific
standpoint” from which judges can assess evidence, so the only reasonable way to determine what
is “scientific” is by looking at community acceptance).
156. See, e.g., BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 43, at 49 (discussing the importance of “[a]ssessing
the cumulative force of all the available information”). In context, the atomistic view makes some
sense. Since Daubert assumes an educative model in which lay factfinders make the substantive
decisions, all that judges need to do is ensure that reliable pieces of evidence reach the jury. Yet,
once we understand that lay factfinders cannot competently make expert decisions, atomized
presentations become problematic. Factfinders cannot defer to atomized pieces of evidence; they
need holistic assessments to which to defer.
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Besides, atomistic evaluation is just “not the way scientists
operate.” 157 As Justice Stevens recognized in his concurrence to General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, scientists commonly take a holistic view of
evidence. 158 They review all of the available evidence, weighting studies
less depending on quality and other characteristics. They even take into
account prior knowledge about the world, so that everything is viewed
in context. 159 Toxicology evidence like an animal study is not reliable or
unreliable; it depends on context. When the epidemiological evidence is
clear, scientists perhaps do not consider animal studies. But when the
epidemiology is not clear, toxicology is appropriate to consider. 160 The
Daubert framework, however, has often had trouble with these kinds of
contextual judgments. 161
A few courts have realized that scientific evidence should be
holistically evaluated and have allowed experts to testify based on a
“weight-of-the-evidence” methodology. 162 Detractors argue that such a
method is too subjective and may be susceptible to expert
overconfidence and overreaching, 163 and in a sense they are right. The
solution is not, however, a return to atomistic evaluation as the
detractors suggest. Subjective assessments are not inherently
157. MICHAELS, supra note 9, at 166.
158. 522 U.S. 136, 153 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is not
intrinsically ‘unscientific’ for experienced professionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all
available scientific evidence . . . .”). As David Michaels further argues:
[W]hen judges who are acting as Daubert gatekeepers declare that isolated studies or
particular experts are not reliable, they are making absolute judgments about the
quality of the science, a role for which they are not qualified. It also conflicts with the
nature of the scientific enterprise, which necessarily deals with “the weight of the
evidence,” not the “reliability” of this or that piece of the whole.
MICHAELS, supra note 9, at 166.
159. POLANYI & PROSCH, supra note 99, at 186 (noting instances in which scientists could find
no immediate fault with a study, but yet “did not believe its results [and] did not even think it
worthwhile to consider what was wrong with it”).
160. Finley, supra note 73, at 354.
161. Commentators have noted that outcomes in scientific evidence cases have a tendency in
practice to track this “weight of the evidence” or “best science available” approach. See id. at 351
(noting that the exclusion of evidence in the Bendectin and silicone breast implant cases “may be
justified” because the epidemiology matured during the litigation and a consensus developed
against the plaintiffs’ claims); see also David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks & Joseph
Sanders, How Good Is Good Enough: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 645, 654–55 (2000) (endorsing a “better evidence principle” for certain types of
expert evidence).
162. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 26 (1st Cir. 2011) (reversing
district court’s exclusion of expert’s use of a weight-of-the-evidence methodology); see also Berger,
supra note 75, at 23–24 (noting split in courts between a holistic and atomistic approach).
163. Lawrence A. Kogan, Weight of the Evidence: A Lower Expert Evidence Standard
Metastasizes in Federal Courts 2, 32–33 (Wash. Legal Found. Critical Legal Issues Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 215, 2020), https://www.wlf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Koganfull-March-2020-WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5K7-QE8V].
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problematic. 164 They only become so when the Daubert framework
focuses on individual experts chosen by the parties and asks them to
make their own judgments. If, as we do under the Consensus Rule, we
focused on the scientific community’s judgment in aggregate, those
adversarial pressures would be far less concerning.
3. Realistic Treatment of Nonscientific Expertise
The Consensus Rule is also a realistic way of treating
nonscientific expertise. Fields like art authentication create a
conundrum for the Daubert framework. Beyond the usual expert
paradox problem, some fields are largely immune to checklists or
empirical testing requirements. For example, if one party claims a
newly found painting is a Jackson Pollock, and the opposing party
denies it, how do we guarantee expert reliability? 165 Jackson Pollock
experts will know his entire corpus, so one cannot do blind proficiency
testing. And while there are objective factors that art authentication
experts use, the ultimate determination is a holistic assessment—one
that is (appropriately) more art than science.
So what is the legal system to do? The answer is surely not to
exclude these art experts for being insufficiently empirically based. The
best people to decide the authenticity of a Jackson Pollock are (almost
by definition) Jackson Pollock experts. And as the Consensus Rule
suggests, the best strategy for authenticating the painting is to ask the
community of Jackson Pollock experts—not to ask an individual expert
for her opinion and certainly not to have the jury decide for itself.
C. Fixing the Structural Evils of Daubert
The Consensus Rule and its accompanying framework fixes
many of the structural distortions created by the Daubert regime.
Because gatekeeping involves an admissibility rule, the Supreme Court
in General Electric Co. v. Joiner 166 held that appellate courts review
trial court Daubert decisions only for abuse of discretion. This
deferential standard of review coheres with the rest of the rules of
evidence, but as many commentators have noted, it transfers
significant decisionmaking power to trial judges.
164. In fact, subjectivity is arguably an unavoidable part of scientific judgment. If one could
combine scientific evidence with an objective formula, we would not need the experts in the first
place.
165. See WHO THE #$&% IS JACKSON POLLOCK? (Picturehouse 2006) (recounting an
authentication dispute over an alleged Jackson Pollock painting).
166. 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
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Consider why Daubert makes trial judges unusually powerful,
especially in civil cases with scientific evidence at their core. Ordinarily,
the sufficiency standard ensures that trial judges can only take
factfinding away from the jury in extreme cases—when no reasonable
jury could find otherwise. Further, when trial courts render judgments
as a matter of law, appellate courts engage in de novo review, with no
deference to the trial judge. But in expert evidence cases, Daubert
gatekeeping disrupts this conventional system of checks and balances.
If a trial judge determines that a party’s experts have insufficient
scientific reliability, she can exclude them under Daubert. This Daubert
ruling, however, is made under Rule 104(a)’s preponderance standard,
not under sufficiency’s more stringent no-reasonable-jury standard.
With the experts excluded, however, the ensuing sufficiency inquiry
becomes a nullity. Without the expert evidence, no reasonable jury can
possibly find for the plaintiff, and so summary judgment follows.
Daubert has thus in effect transferred power from the jury to the trial
judge in scientific cases. Whereas in ordinary cases judges need to meet
the no-reasonable-jury standard to intervene, in scientific cases they
merely need to meet a preponderance standard. 167
The appellate review standard exacerbates the problem. Under
Joiner, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s Daubert decision
only for abuse of discretion. The appellate court, as always, reviews the
sufficiency decision de novo, but since the Daubert ruling has already
excluded the expert evidence, the sufficiency inquiry is again a nullity.
So not only has the Daubert framework transferred power from the jury
to the trial judge, it has insulated the trial court’s decision from
appellate review.
The Consensus Rule avoids these structural distortions and
maintains a more conventional division of power. The jury remains
empowered to determine the position of the expert community. The trial
court polices this decision under ordinary sufficiency standards. If no
reasonable jury could conclude that the expert community does not
believe a fact involving specialized knowledge, then the trial court can
find that fact as a matter of law. The trial court’s decision on this matter
is then reviewed de novo by the appellate court.
Uniformity in decisionmaking is also promoted by the
Consensus Rule. If the consensus is obvious on a general fact, an
appellate court can step in and decide that factual question as a matter
of law. That precedent can then serve to make future handling of the

167. Berger, supra note 75, at 20–21 (noting that Joiner has the effect of fusing admissibility
and sufficiency into a single abuse-of-discretion standard).
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scientific question more efficient. 168 After all, either a chemical is
carcinogenic or not, so if there is a clear consensus on the answer, the
courts within a jurisdiction should be uniform in their conclusion.
D. Maintaining Adversarialism
Finally, while the Consensus Rule is radical in some ways, it is
able to solve the expert paradox problem while preserving adversarial
legal values. Unlike solutions like court-appointed experts or technical
advisors, 169 the Consensus Rule remains a party-driven process. Judges
do not suddenly need to find and appoint neutral experts or take on
other active roles. 170 The parties continue to hire and present their own
experts, providing their attorneys with familiar tasks and the feeling of
control. The only difference is the change in the question asked. The
dramatis personae also remains the same—a generalist judge, a lay
jury, the attorneys, and party-called witnesses. The Consensus Rule
does not require the introduction of additional actors, whether they are
neutral experts, science magistrates, 171 or expert tribunals. 172
These trappings may seem conceptually irrelevant, and perhaps
they are to some extent. Indeed, departing from adversarialism may
further help inquiries under the Consensus Rule. 173 But history
suggests that departing too far from standard practice often dooms
proposed scientific evidence reforms to failure. Commentators have
proposed the use of court-appointed experts since the first cases
involving expert witnesses, yet court-appointed experts have never
caught on. 174 The most probable reason is that neutral experts seem
alien to the American legal system. Judges shun them as antithetical

168. This procedure is similar to one developed by some appellate courts through a judicial
notice mechanism. E.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Ky. 1999); Hernandez v.
State, 116 S.W.3d 26, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Judicial notice, however, is arguably not the
correct conceptual framework. For one thing, it is not any appellate court determination that
should be judicially noticed, but only those in which no reasonable jury could find differently. For
another, judicial notice suggests a certain permanence and indisputability which could be
counterproductive. If the underlying scientific consensus changes, the appellate court should be
ready to overrule the empirically dependent precedent.
169. FED. R. EVID. 706.
170. Edith Beerdsen, Litigation Science After the Knowledge Crisis, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 529,
584–85 (2021).
171. Dillon, supra note 66, at 295–301.
172. Hand, supra note 15, at 56 (proposing expert tribunals).
173. For example, determinations of scientific consensus could be made through courtappointed panels or even by asking scientific organizations directly.
174. Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1387, 1393–96 (2006).
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to passive judicial values, and attorneys oppose them for fear of losing
control over the litigation. 175
The Consensus Rule thus offers an elegant solution to the battle
of the experts. It eliminates the most pernicious aspect—the problem of
having nonexperts judge experts—by deferring to the expert
community. It however retains the “battle” aspect cherished by
defenders of the adversarial system. The parties continue to be able to
present warring experts of their choice, but now the lay factfinder has
the competency to sort through the testimony.
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT THE CONSENSUS RULE
As promising as the Consensus Rule is as a solution to the expert
paradox, it raises some concerns. Is deference to an institution outside
the legal process legitimate? What happens if a given expert
community’s view is misguided or entrenched? How is consensus
defined, and what tools will litigants and factfinders use to determine
it? And finally, despite the claims to the contrary, might the Consensus
Rule be simply too radical—both doctrinally and practically? Does it
infringe too much on the jury’s domain or represent too significant a
departure from traditional admissibility rules? This Part addresses all
of these questions in turn.
A. The Legitimacy Objection
The legitimacy objection to the Consensus Rule—or any
deferential approach to expert evidence—is perhaps best expressed by
Tony Ward:
It is axiomatic, at least in Anglo-American law, that judges and juries are responsible for
reaching verdicts on the basis of their own understanding of the evidence presented to
them. This task is not to be delegated to experts. Implicitly, the law is committed to an
internalist epistemology: decisions about what the courts are to take to be true must not
only be reliable . . . but must be justified from the perspective of those who make them. If
experts “stood in for” the jury, they might or might not make more accurate decisions, but
those decisions would not be justified in the constitutionally accepted way. 176

Ward further argues that this axiom is seen in doctrines that bar
evidence without explanation, such as the ban on credibility experts or
the prohibition on ipse dixit expert testimony. 177 Legal actors must
175. Gross, supra note 8, at 1197–99 (arguing that the neglect of court-appointed experts is
due partly to trial bar opposition and partly to an adversarially focused judicial outlook).
176. Ward, supra note 113, at 266 (footnotes omitted).
177. Id. at 272; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 137 (1997)
(“Nothing . . . requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data
only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”); Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert
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operate on the basis of evidence “accessible to them (and the public at
large).” 178
Responding to the legitimacy objection requires that we unpack
the reasons for this purported commitment to an internalist
epistemology. These reasons are interrelated to be sure, but there are
at least three distinct streams in the legitimacy objection: one about the
nature of knowledge, another about democracy, and a final one about
public acceptability.
1. Not Knowledge
The knowledge stream has its origins in conventional arguments
that “appeals to authority” either do not constitute actual knowledge or
are a form of inferior knowledge. 179 A factfinder’s decision based on
deference is accordingly insufficiently justified and thus illegitimate.
This traditional position, however, has become increasingly questioned
as epistemologists have acknowledged that what we know depends on
the testimony of others. 180 The deference to the expert community
involved in the Consensus Rule is also different from usual appeals to
authority. As philosopher Allan Hazlett suggests, the reasoning behind
deference to scientific consensus comes not from authority per se, but
the process—“the extent to which the proposition . . . has emerged
intact from a certain process of empirical testing and academic
criticism.” 181 The fact that a scientific consensus exists, independent of
authority, makes it likely that the consensus finding is true. 182
We can also simply reject Ward’s rather strong premise. Perhaps
the legal system prefers an internal epistemology, but the law does not
require it regardless of the cost to accuracy. 183 Even if reliance on
authority is not “knowledge” in some philosophical sense, in certain

Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1001–02 (2007) (noting that the ban on credibility experts is
controversial under modern evidence law).
178. Ward, supra note 113, at 274.
179. WALTON, supra note 19, at 67–68 (discussing arguments that appeals to authority are not
actual knowledge, or that they are inferior because authority can become “tyrannical and
irrational”).
180. Walton argues that the mistake made by traditional arguments is that they view appeals
to authority in binary terms: right or wrong. Id. at 29. Instead, he suggests that there should be a
presumption in favor of expert authority, but one that is subject to critical inquiry. Id. at 28–30.
181. Allan Hazlett, The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief, 94 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 131,
149 (2016).
182. Id. at 148 (“I appeal to something like the principle that there would not easily be a
scientific consensus that p unless it were the case that p.”).
183. Ward, supra note 113, at 274–75 (“When assessing expert evidence, the task of juries and
judges is to determine the strength of the reasons accessible to them (and to the public at large) for
believing what experts assert.”).
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contexts it can still form the basis of justified decisions, 184 and expert
evidence is precisely one of those contexts. The deference to the expert
is not done out of laziness; it is a calculated strategy that maximizes the
chance of arriving at the correct result under the constraints we face. 185
2. Not Democratic
Another aspect to the legitimacy concern is that deference is
antidemocratic. This objection is primarily political as opposed to
epistemic. Courts are public institutions, and juries are an element of
participatory democracy. Forcing factfinders to defer to the scientific
community, which is not representative of the public, smacks of
usurpation.
In responding to this concern, we should emphasize the limited
deference that the Consensus Rule requires. The factfinder only defers
on matters involving specialized factual knowledge. Decisions involving
nonspecialized knowledge and (more importantly) value judgments
remain firmly within the purview of the judge or jury. One reason why
the jury is an important democratic institution is because it enables
ordinary citizens to decide value-laden aspects of cases, and this power
remains untouched. Besides, on factual matters, since it will typically
lack firsthand knowledge, the jury will always need to defer at some
level—perhaps not as formally as with the Consensus Rule, but at some
level nevertheless.
Additionally, under the Consensus Rule, the (democratic)
factfinder is still deciding the case. Unlike with the use of expert
tribunals, we have not replaced the jury with a nondemocratically
accountable institution. The jury critically remains morally accountable
for its decision; it is not abdicating its role as a check on the legal
system. To be sure, the Consensus Rule changes somewhat the
questions that the jury answers, but the jury is still the

184. Hardwig, supra note 102, at 339 (arguing that even if a layperson (i) did not do the
inquiry; (ii) is not competent to do the inquiry; (iii) cannot assess the expert’s evidence; and
(iv) cannot even understand the expert’s evidence, the layperson’s belief can still be “rationally
justified”).
185. WALTON, supra note 19, at 73–75 (discussing that there are unreasonable appeals to
authority, such as when a person is not an expert or lacks qualifications, and reasonable ones such
as when a person has additional knowledge); Hardwig, supra note 102, at 340 (arguing that even
though Kant holds independent judgment up as the ideal, there is no moral duty to do so in all
cases because it is impractical); see also NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE
VERDICT 177–79 (2007) (suggesting that relying on credentials “need not be irrational or silly,
particularly if issues are esoteric and complex or if one side’s experts have stronger or more
germane credentials than the other’s”).
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decisionmaker. 186 And while the Consensus Rule does limit the jury’s
decisionmaking power, at no point has the legal system ever said that
the jury’s discretion is unfettered. 187 Indeed, the desire to guide (or
control) juries motivates much if not all of the law of evidence. 188
There are two other arguments that the Consensus Rule is
somehow undemocratic. One is that it is “elitist, since it implies that
some people’s opinions are more valuable than others.” 189 Elitism,
however, arguably requires (a) unjustified preferences for (b) an ingroup, and the Consensus Rule involves neither. As philosopher C. A. J.
Coady has well articulated:
Two things should be said about [the elitism objection]. The first is that some people’s
opinions are more valuable than others, because some people are better informed than
others. The second is that it is not as if there are two groups of people, the experts and
the novices. We are all novices with respect to some subjects, and (I would suggest) experts
with respect to others. 190

The other “undemocratic” argument is that deference impairs
democratic accountability in the sense that it prevents decisionmakers
from giving reasoned explanations for their decisions. 191 This objection,
however, is a rather odd one to make in the jury context, which is
characterized by general verdicts with no explanation at all. In fact, the
focus on scientific consensus may in fact make jury decisions under the
Consensus Rule more interpretable than at present.

186. On this score, Allan Hazlett poses an interesting hypothetical involving the citizens of
Testimonia, who “base all of their beliefs on the testimony” of “an omniscient . . . benefactor.”
Hazlett, supra note 181, at 144. He argues that under these conditions, referenda in Testimonia
are “kind of a sham, and not fully democratic.” Id. The critical difference between the Consensus
Rule and Testimonia, however, is the extent of the deference. By handing over not only factual but
also moral questions to the benefactor, the citizens of Testimonia have indeed abdicated their
responsibility and accountability. The jury under the Consensus Rule has not.
187. Ilya Somin has argued that even in the voting context, it is unethical “to make decisions
based on ignorance, regardless of whether deference to scientists or some other strategy could
enable them to make better-informed choices.” Somin, supra note 103; see also Ilya Somin, Jason
Brennan’s The Ethics of Voting, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 12, 2011, 9:10 AM),
https://volokh.com/2011/04/12/jason-brennans-the-ethics-of-voting/
[https://perma.cc/H3SCQUYG] (disagreeing with “the default assumption . . . that it is perfectly ethical for voters to
support any candidate for any reason they want”).
188. The theory that evidence law is about “epistemic paternalism” goes back to at least
Thayer and Wigmore. Hock Lai Ho, The Legal Concept of Evidence, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Edward
N. Zalta ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence-legal/ (rev. Oct. 8, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/3XG8-VAHD].
189. COADY, supra note 41, at 31.
190. Id.
191. Ward, supra note 113, at 265 (arguing that strong deference is inappropriate when “the
beliefs adopted from the expert have to be publicly justified”); COADY, supra note 112, at 296
(opposing expert panels because it would create the danger that courts would not produce a result
explicable to all parties).
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3. Not “Acceptable”
A final aspect of the legitimacy objection involves public
acceptability. As Charlie Nesson famously argued in the statistical
evidence context, the goal of the proof process is not only accurate
verdicts, but acceptable ones as well. 192 If juries defer to scientific
consensus rather than deciding substantive expert questions
independently, will that make their verdicts less “acceptable” in some
way to the public? The available social science suggests not—in fact, the
public often finds the opinion of the scientific community compelling
when trying to make conclusions on scientific issues. For example, one
recent study found that one of the most influential factors in predicting
a person’s views on a disputed scientific issue is the majority vote of
scientists, and this factor is most influential when the topic was esoteric
and unfamiliar. 193 This result holds even for scientific disputes that
have become politicized. For example, “highlighting the (normative)
consensus among medical scientists that vaccines are ‘safe’ ” seems to
both convince subjects that there is more agreement and improve their
attitudes toward vaccination. 194 Similarly, “highlighting scientific
consensus increases belief in human-caused climate change.” 195 To be
sure, consensus does not convince everybody, but the studies certainly
suggest that an earnest, in-depth examination of the scientific
consensus does indeed influence lay decisionmaking, even under the
most trying of circumstances.

192. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?: On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1985).
193. Branden B. Johnson, Nathan F. Dieckmann & Marcus Mayorga, Cues to Relative
Credibility: Their Relative Influence on Lay Americans’ Judgments of Disputing Groups of
Scientists
19–21
(Mar.
10,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3552167
[https://perma.cc/FZ4Y-3PCP]
(observing that these factors had their strongest effect on questions about dark matter and their
weakest effect on questions about marijuana). But see Branden B. Johnson, “Counting Votes” in
Public Responses to Scientific Disputes, 27 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 594, 606 (2018) (finding in
a different study that information on the distribution of scientist views “had modest indirect
effects”).
194. Sander L. van der Linden, Chris E. Clarke & Edward W. Maibach, Highlighting
Consensus Among Medical Scientists Increases Public Support for Vaccines: Evidence from a
Randomized Experiment, 15 BMC PUB. HEALTH, Dec. 2015, at 3.
195. Sander L. van der Linden, Anthony A. Leiserowitz, Geoffery D. Feinberg & Edward W.
Maibach, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change as a Gateway Belief: Experimental Evidence,
10 PLOS ONE, Feb. 2015, at 2; see also id. at 6 (finding no evidence of a “backfire” effect in which
the consensus information caused subjects to entrench their positions).
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B. The Problem of Conservatism
What if the experts are wrong? 196 Another complaint levelled
against deference is that it can be excessively conservative. The expert
community can be subject to bias, 197 and its entrenched interests can
perpetuate wrong-headed ideas. 198 Consequently, deferring to
consensus can result in the legal system being behind the times. 199
The Consensus Rule is perhaps a touch conservative, as it
automatically rejects cutting-edge or controversial positions. But given
the context, it arguably does so with good justification. Since legal
actors lack epistemic competence on expert topics, they will find it
difficult if not impossible to separate the wheat from the chaff. So the
Consensus Rule plays the probabilities. Which rule is more accurate
more of the time: (a) asking lay decisionmakers to sort through expert
theories distorted by the adversarial process; or (b) simply deferring to
the prevailing opinion in the expert community? The choice seems clear.
For most cases, the reader will likely agree with the merits of
“playing the odds” in this way. Two archetypal cases, however, will
contribute to some nagging doubts. The first, which we can call “heroic
cases,” involve famous instances in which the establishment ridiculed a
radical theory only to be proven wrong by history. The second, which we
can label “obvious cases,” involve entrenched expert communities which
are “clearly” wrong to objective outsiders. In a sense, these special
cases—the chance to do something special, and the chance to avoid
obviously dumb decisions—are the cost of rule-based decisionmaking
under the Consensus Rule. This Section tackles each in turn.

196. FREEDMAN, supra note 57, at 87 (quoting Bertrand Russell) (“Even when the experts all
agree, they may well be mistaken.”).
197. Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights,
84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 1014 (1999) (noting that expert opinions are similarly subject to bias and
discrimination).
198. WALTON, supra note 19, at 70 (quoting ROBERT H. THOULESS, STRAIGHT AND CROOKED
THINKING (1936) as arguing that the “prestige of professors and learned men has been used to
crush many movements of scientific discovery at their beginning”); Barbara Pfeffer Billauer,
Daubert Debunked: A History of Legal Retrogression and the Need to Redefine ‘Science’ in Law, 21
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 37 (2015) (quoting Max Planck) (“[N]ew scientific truth does
not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its
opponents eventually die . . . .”).
199. ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 9, at 64 (noting that consensus reports from the National
Academy of Sciences often end up with “least common denominator” findings, and that “[r]adical
claims rarely pass through this process intact—even ones that later turn out to be true”); cf. Solove,
supra note 197, at 1013 (arguing that institutions can have customs that are resistant to change).
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1. Heroic Cases
History celebrates scientists whose theories were first derided
by the establishment but later proven true. The classic stories have
produced household (or close to household) names: Copernicus, Galileo,
Mendel (genetics), Semmelweis (germ theory). More modern cases
typically produce Nobel Prizes. For years, the medical establishment
dismissed Barry Marshall and Robin Warren’s claim that stomach
ulcers were caused by a bacterium, H. pylori, rather than excess
stomach acid. They shared the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 2005. 200
By deferring, the Consensus Rule does hamper the legal
system’s ability to be an agent for change. 201 But we should
acknowledge that heroic cases are famous in part because they are
exceptional. Under regular circumstances, mainstream science has the
correct answer, or at least the best answer given current knowledge—
that is why the scientific community commands respect. Among the
multitude of maverick ideas, there may be a black swan that will one
day become the consensus view, but the odds of picking that one
pathbreaker are long. 202 Most crazy ideas remain crazy ideas.
This argument does not mean that experts should not take
seriously the iconoclastic ideas of their peers. That is how scientific
inquiry progresses—with publication, replication, refutation, and the
like. Rather, the argument is that the legal system should not be looking
to find the proverbial needle in the haystack. The question about
whether stomach acid or bacteria causes ulcers was one for doctors to
debate over many years, not for the legal system and its lay
decisionmakers to decide over the course of two weeks. 203 Experts are
able to properly process the maverick ideas; legal actors are not. 204 As

200. The
Nobel
Prize
in
Physiology
or
Medicine
2005,
NOBEL
PRIZE,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/2005/summary/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/3YJM-YNME].
201. WALTON, supra note 19, at 1–2 (raising the issue that deference to authority prevents
movement in thought); Billauer, supra note 198, at 38–39 (referencing many occasions where
pathbreaking work was ridiculed).
202. 5 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.6 (“Commentators [defending] Frye argue that for
every Galileo or Einstein there are hundreds of Lysenkos with ‘revolutionary’ theories that are
eventually proven false by empirical research.”); COLLINS, supra note 26, at 92.
203. COLLINS, supra note 26, at 92.
204. Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 193–94 (Fla. 1989) (“[A] courtroom is not a laboratory,
and as such it is not the place to conduct scientific experiments. If the scientific community
considers a procedure or process unreliable for its own purposes, then the procedure must be
considered less reliable for courtroom use.”).
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such, while the Consensus Rule forgoes making the heroic decision, it
is the best we can do under the circumstances. 205
Finally, it is worth reemphasizing the limited nature of the
deference required by the Consensus Rule. Deference does not apply to
new scientific areas with active disputes, nor does it apply to political
or other nonexpert issues. Thus, the Consensus Rule does not foreclose
courts from guiding the development of nascent technologies, as they
did in DNA profiling. 206 It also does not inhibit courts from using their
independence to heroically reform troubling social institutions. 207
2. “Obvious” Cases
Deference is an especially bitter pill if the consensus position
appears obviously wrong or unjustified. What happens if the relevant
expert community is a guild 208 founded on dubious or nonscientific
precepts, or the community is so entrenched or captured by special
interests that the consensus seems illegitimate? 209 A number of
philosophers have suggested that in these cases, departing from
consensus may be acceptable. 210 For example, Lawrence Lengbeyer
argues that a layperson can justifiably refuse to defer if an ostensibly
science-based recommendation involves nonscientific reasoning,
overgeneralization, or research “of doubtful quality.” 211 After all, if the
expert community is not operating under the rules we expect of science,
why defer?
As tempting as such a safety valve may be, we should be
reluctant to adopt it. For one thing, the standard is extremely difficult
to apply. Lengbeyer argues for nondeference only when laypersons can
205. Billauer, supra note 198, at 39–41 (acknowledging that the general acceptance test “may
be the best we have in some legal circumstances”).
206. Cf. Solove, supra note 197, at 1012–13 (arguing that the problem with deference is that
it “undermine[s] the most important contribution of the judiciary to contemporary problems:
critical inquiry”).
207. See id. at 1015–16 (criticizing deference because “the judiciary gives inadequate attention
to the troubled history of certain institutions”).
208. E.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK.
L. REV. 13, 64–65 (2001) (noting the problem of allowing professionals to testify when the
profession’s practices are at issue).
209. COLLINS, supra note 26, at 112 (suggesting nonexpert criticism of scientific consensus
may be valid when those criticisms involve lay meta-expertise, such as evidence of a conspiracy,
etc.); Hardwig, supra note 102, at 342 (criticisms about bias and bad faith are justified reasons for
refusing to defer).
210. See Boaz Miller, Scientific Consensus and Expert Testimony in Courts: Lessons from the
Bendectin Litigation, 21 FOUNDS. SCI. 15, 20–21 (2016) (discussing a theory of knowledge-based
consensus, which requires shared assumptions and standards, multiple streams of evidence, and
a socially diverse pool of members).
211. Lengbeyer, supra note 123, at 1.
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“discernibly” spot such flaws, but again, given that lay actors will lack
expertise, how will they be able to detect nonscientific reasoning or
dubious research quality? The inquiry would quickly revert to the
Daubert framework. Relatedly, the decisionmaking literature has
shown in other contexts that statistical decision rules often work better
without such safety valves, because decisionmakers find too many
special cases and destroy the advantages of the rule. 212 The trade-off is
a familiar one between rules and standards: a rule may seem over- or
under-inclusive at times but may provide more accuracy overall than a
case-by-case standard. Evidence law makes this tradeoff all the time.
Hearsay or character evidence is not always unreliable; we just do not
trust juries (or even judges) to handle it on a case-by-case basis.
In many ways, even in “obvious cases,” change should come from
within the expert community, not from nonexpert legal decisionmakers.
If the extant subcommunity is too entrenched, then change will require
entry by experts from other fields or a new generation. But the key is
that the legal system should wait for the experts to get it right (or for
sufficient controversy to break the consensus), not strike off on its own.
This process is in a sense what has happened with traditional forensic
identification methods. Recent commentators have expressed
frustration that courts have not lived up to their Daubert
responsibilities, but in fact, courts may be unknowingly (but correctly)
following a Consensus Rule approach.
C. Determining Consensus
Another objection to the Consensus Rule involves operational
details. How will legal actors determine the existence and the content
of a consensus? Critics of Frye have argued that “general acceptance”
was both difficult to prove and easy to manipulate, a situation that
made the standard unworkable. 213
Like most worthwhile questions asked in the legal context, there
are few straightforward answers to the problem of proving consensus.
Determining consensus is difficult in some cases, and less so in others.
But the absolute difficulty of the question is somewhat beside the point,
because relative to the substantive scientific questions asked by the
212. We see this most famously in the psychological literature on statistical predictions of
dangerousness. In that context, naïve statistical prediction rules are more accurate than the
individualized clinical judgments of experts. If a safety valve is added so clinicians can exempt
special cases, accurate rates actually go down. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust & Paul E.
Meehl, Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668, 1671 (1989) (reviewing literature).
And note that this stunning result occurs when the safety valve is operated by an expert, not a lay
person.
213. E.g., WALTON, supra note 19, at 178; Jasanoff, supra note 106, at 1728.
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Daubert framework, Consensus Rule questions are far more
manageable. At least answering the consensus question requires no
special expertise.
Consensus is a bit like the reasonable person standard in
negligence. The inquiry is more vague than we might prefer, but it is
squarely within the competency of a lay factfinder. And the vagueness
in our context is arguably more acceptable than in the Frye context.
Vagueness in admissibility standards gives judges discretion to usurp
the jury’s role as factfinder. With the Consensus Rule, the jury itself
determines consensus (except in extreme cases), so discretion is
arguably less problematic.
Besides, just as legal actors use various tools to give contour to
the nebulous reasonable person standard—definitions, cost-benefit
analysis, industry customs, regulations, etc.—so too are there tools and
guideposts to help the jury in deciding consensus. We discuss some of
them below.
1. Definitions
One cause of ambiguity in this context comes from the
imprecision of language. The word consensus has two partly conflicting
dictionary meanings: (1) a “general agreement: unanimity”; and (2) “the
judgment arrived at by most of those concerned.” 214 At one pole,
consensus can mean unanimity, which might induce objections that
consensus hardly ever exists. At the other pole, consensus can mean
majority, which might cause other objections that a majority rule is
insufficient and that the “dissensus” condition will never exist.
For our purposes, consensus means neither of those two poles,
but rather something in between. 215 Remember that the term
“Consensus Rule” is only a shorthand for the actual standard, which is:
“If the relevant scientific community believes a fact involving
specialized knowledge.” 216 The standard therefore is really about
shared belief, group decisionmaking, and when it is fair to attribute a
particular substantive position to a group as a whole. 217 Under our

214. Consenus,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/consensus (last visited Dec. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9LCL-KA69].
215. John Beatty & Alfred Moore, Should We Aim for Consensus?, 7 EPISTEME 198, 200 (2010)
(arguing against unanimity and majority because both potentially mask a lack of deliberative
thought).
216. Supra Section II.B.
217. Miller, supra note 210, at 19 (defining consensus as “roughly, [when the members] have
agreed to let the content of the shared belief stand as the position of the group”); Beatty & Moore,
supra note 215, at 207 (same); Margaret Gilbert, Modelling Collective Belief, 73 SYNTHESE 185,
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definition of consensus, there may be individual experts who disagree
substantively, but reasonable experts will all agree that the position
represents their community. Consensus is thus not about unanimity 218
or some quantitative threshold, but rather requires judgment—
judgment that the factfinder is equipped to exercise. Indeed, the
subjectivity here is arguably a feature, as a threshold would just
encourage further manipulation by the parties. 219
2. Tools for Determining Consensus
Proving consensus under the Consensus Rule will involve many
types of evidence and depend on context. Fortunately, however, legal
actors already face this question when attempting to establish “general
acceptance” under Frye or as a factor under Daubert.
Perhaps the most popular method of proving general acceptance
is through testimony. An expert simply reports on what her expert
community believes. While straightforward, reliance on experts raises
familiar problems, including the battle of experts. Recall, however, that
this battle of experts is far less problematic than the traditional battle
of experts over substantive expert issues, as a lay decisionmaker is
qualified to assess contradictory testimony on what a community
believes. Indeed, one might even argue that testimony about what an
expert community believes approaches lay testimony, as it hardly
involves expert judgment at all. 220
One can also prove general acceptance through consensus
statements that are periodically issued by expert organizations. Most
famous among these are the reports of the National Research Council,
which have included influential works on DNA profiling, 221
polygraphs, 222 electromagnetic fields, 223 and forensics. 224 Other
194 (1987) (“A group G believes that p if and only if it is common knowledge that the individual
members of G have openly expressed their willingness to let p stand as the view of G.”).
218. Miller, supra note 210, at 19 (arguing consensus is not zero dissent).
219. See Beatty & Moore, supra note 215, at 200 (arguing that requiring unanimity
“encourages misleading reports of the state of scientific agreement to the public” and “unfairly
privileges the status quo”).
220. Testimony about what the scientific community believes is of course specialized, but only
slightly more so than, say, reputation testimony about what a community believes about a person’s
character.
221. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE (1996).
222. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003).
223. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., POSSIBLE HEALTH EFFECT OF EXPOSURE TO
RESIDENTIAL ELECTRIC AND MAGNETIC FIELDS (1997).
224. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).
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organizations have issued similar consensus statements, such as the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s reports. 225
Consensus statements, however, are not always available, so a
factfinder may also rely on other types of systematic reviews.
Depending on the specifics, they may be more or less representative of
the expert community’s judgment, but still provide evidence of the
consensus. Cochrane (formerly known as the Cochrane Collaboration),
for example, produces systematic reviews of the medical and health
literature. 226 The Mental Measurements Yearbook compiles
information on psychological test validity. 227 Even treatises and metaanalyses by individuals or groups of authors are a reflection of what the
consensus is, though these may have a greater risk of bias. As long as
the factfinder uses these tools to ask the deferential question rather
than the substantive one, it continues to apply the Consensus Rule.
Beyond these more traditional pathways, there may be other,
more creative tools for ascertaining general acceptance as well. For
example, building on the work of Uri Shwed and Peter Bearman, I have
proposed using citation networks to determine the existence and
content of a scientific consensus. 228 Susan Fiske and Eugene Borgida
have proposed “adversarial collaboration,” in which two opposing
researchers write a joint statement as a way of extracting consensus
positions. 229 And Adina Schwartz has proposed a procedure called “dual
iterated disinterested acceptance,” in which a third party (perhaps an
organization) would identify two noncollaborating experts from the
community to opine on general acceptance. 230
3. Consensus on Case-Specific Facts
Case-specific facts present a difficult challenge for the
Consensus Rule. An expert community will almost always have views
225. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING
°C (2018).
226. See About Us, COCHRANE, https://www.cochrane.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 14, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/YC9M-QTAV].
227. Tess M.S. Neal, Christopher Slobogin, Michael J. Saks, David L. Faigman & Kurt F.
Geisinger, Psychological Assessments in Legal Contexts: Are Courts Keeping “Junk Science” Out of
the Courtroom?, 20 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 135, 138 (2019) (characterizing the Mental Measurements
Yearbook (MMY) as “the most accurate, complete, and authoritative source of information about
published psychological tests”).
228. Edward K. Cheng, Proving General Acceptance Using Modularity (June 30, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Uri Shwed & Peter S. Bearman, The Temporal
Structure of Scientific Consensus Formation, 75 AM. SOCIO. REV. 817, 818–20 (2010) (discussing
citation networks).
229. Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Standards for Using Social Psychological Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 867, 872 (2011).
230. Schwartz, supra note 44, at 206–07.
OF 1.5
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on general facts relevant to it. Sometimes there will be a consensus, and
sometimes not, but the expert community will have at least considered
the answer. Case-specific facts, by contrast, will not garner such
attention.
We can adapt the Consensus Rule to these situations in two
related ways. One possibility is for the factfinder to use the Consensus
Rule as a mental framework or thought experiment. If experts testify
about case-specific findings, such as an accident reconstruction, the jury
can use that testimony to determine the facts that the relevant expert
community likely would have found. The other possibility is for the
factfinder to use the Consensus Rule to determine the appropriate
method for an expert to use (a general fact), and then defer to that
expert’s application of the method. The key structural elements remain
the same. The jury, not the judge, is the principal decisionmaker, and
it takes a deferential perspective, looking to the community’s accepted
practices or conclusions. 231
D. Radicalism Concern: Inference
A final objection that critics may raise is that the Consensus
Rule is too radical—that the use of an inference rule that is deeply
deferential is foreign to what we have come to expect. Yet, while both
aspects may be a little unusual for the legal system, neither is
unprecedented. The evidence law does at times regulate inferences, and
the legal system also at times defers to expert communities.
1. Regulating Inference
As previously mentioned, the Consensus Rule is not a rule of
admissibility, but a rule of inference, and inference rules may at first
seem foreign to American law. Much of American evidence law focuses
on admissibility and seems to expect that factfinders will make their
own independent inferences. Unlike other legal traditions, we do not
have rules requiring a certain number of witnesses (so-called “counting
rules”). 232 We do not tell factfinders how to weight or preference some
231. If the expert community lacks sufficient individualized data and would decline to make
specific determinations, then the situation is one of dissensus. The jury would receive the general
fact evidence under the Consensus Rule, but would otherwise be free to make its own independent
findings on the specific facts. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin,
Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 425–26
(2014) (discussing instances in which researchers agree that there is insufficient data to
individuate from group findings).
232. See John H. Wigmore, Required Numbers of Witnesses; A Brief History of the Numerical
System in England, 15 HARV. L. REV. 83, 83 (1901) (English common law recognizes that one
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kinds of evidence over others. 233 And in part because of general jury
verdicts and secret jury deliberations, we have no accumulated
precedent on inferences, valid or not. Direct inferential interventions
occur only in extreme cases, such as when sufficiency rules remove an
issue entirely from the factfinder.
But to say that evidence law does not regulate inferences is
plainly false. Admissibility rules, although rather blunt instruments,
are rules of inference. A factfinder cannot make inferences using
evidence it does not hear, so admissibility rules indirectly regulate
inference through screening. When courts ask juries to use evidence for
one purpose and not for another, they regulate inference further and
with greater precision. Evidentiary presumptions similarly tell
factfinders what inferences to make in the absence of evidence, though
the theory that underlies them is admittedly controversial.
Further, two inferential devices share some kinship with the
Consensus Rule and may make it seem less foreign. The first is judicial
notice. Rule 201 permits the judicial notice of adjudicative facts if it “is
not subject to reasonable dispute,” 234 thus allowing the court to force
the jury to find certain facts based on the reliability of their source. 235
Unlike the Consensus Rule, however, judicial notice operates only in
extreme cases, as seen in the language requiring no reasonable dispute.
On the other hand, judicial notice applies to nonspecialized facts, in
which the judge possesses no greater epistemic competence than the
jury. Judicial notice also completely supplants the jury—the judge
determines the absence of reasonable dispute, which in turn determines
the fact. 236 By contrast, the Consensus Rule asks the jury to determine
the consensus.
The second are so-called “irrebuttable” or “conclusive”
presumptions. Nearly all legal scholars have eschewed the term as
being an “awkwardly expressed [substantive] rule of law” 237 because an
irrebuttable presumption is essentially a legal definition: to say that
fact A creates an irrebuttable presumption of fact B is to define fact B

witness is fundamentally insufficient). But see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“No Person shall be
convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on
Confession in open Court.”).
233. The exceptions, again, are preferences operationalized through admissibility rules. See,
e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804 (preferencing live testimony over hearsay unless the declarant is
unavailable).
234. FED. R. EVID. 201.
235. Id. (allowing judicial notice of the fact if it is “generally known” or “can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”).
236. See FED. R. EVID. 201(c)(1).
237. RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 553 (3d ed. 2004).
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to include fact A. 238 But whether expressed as an irrebuttable
presumption or as a definition, these kinds of rules are commonplace.
For example, children under eighteen are conclusively presumed to be
wholly dependent on a decedent worker under workers’ compensation
law, 239 and federal antiterrorism laws define a “terrorist organization”
to be “an organization designated [by the Secretary of State] as a
terrorist organization.” 240 These irrebutable presumptions in a sense do
what the Consensus Rule does. They define one fact—“dependency” or
“terrorist organization”—using a predicate fact. The factfinder finds the
predicate fact, and the other fact follows. So too with the Consensus
Rule—the jury determines the scientific consensus, and the scientific
fact follows.
There are two characteristics of the Consensus Rule, however,
that may make it seem different from a conclusive presumption. One is
that it involves the judgment of another (the expert community), which
smacks of delegation. Rather than asking the factfinder to find a
predicative fact directly, the Consensus Rule asks the factfinder to
determine what the scientific community thinks. This procedure,
however, is analogous to the antiterrorism statute, which defers to the
Secretary of State. 241 The other, perhaps more important distinguishing
characteristic is that the Consensus Rule is trans-substantive. For the
most part, irrebuttable presumptions and definitional clauses operate
in a single substantive area. The Consensus Rule by contrast would
operate across all legal doctrines and apply to intermediate facts as well
as explicit legal elements.
Finally, for criminal trials, there may also be concerns about
whether the Consensus Rule infringes on a defendant’s right to a jury
trial, but these are arguably spurious, at least according to current
Supreme Court doctrine. A criminal defendant is entitled to a jury
determination on “all elements of the offense charged.” 242 However, this
jury trial right is generally thought to extend only to elements and not

238. James J. Duane provides a series of excellent examples of the needless use of “irrebuttable
presumption” language in The Constitutionality of Irrebuttable Presumptions, 19 REGENT UNIV. L.
REV. 149, 151–56 (2006).
239. Id. at 167 (citing the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Law, VA. CODE ANN. § 652-515(A)
(2002)).
240. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds
and remanded, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6).
241. 18 U.S.C § 2339B(g)(6).
242. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–79 (1993); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995).
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intermediate facts or the evidence used to prove them. 243 Furthermore,
recent violations of the jury trial right have involved judicial
determinations of an element. 244 By contrast, the Consensus Rule
retains the jury as the determiner of the predicate fact (i.e., the
scientific consensus), and in most cases, the rule will operate on some
intermediate fact, not an element itself.
2. Deference
In addition to raising legitimacy concerns, the Consensus Rule’s
deferential approach may also seem alien to a legal system that
celebrates the independence of juries. As we see below, however,
deference to expert communities does occur in the legal system, often in
contexts exhibiting the same epistemic competence difficulties
presented by scientific evidence.
a. Medical Malpractice
Traditionally, in medical practice law, the jury does not
independently decide the standard of care using a reasonable person
standard. The jury defers to the medical community by determining
whether the defendant doctor violated the custom of the profession. The
reason? As one classic text suggests, “[N]o other standard is practical.
Our judges and juries are usually not competent to judge whether or
not a doctor has acted reasonably. The conformity test is probably the
only workable test available.” 245
The procedure for proving a violation of medical custom shares
characteristics with the Consensus Rule. Typically, the parties “ask[ ]
medical experts whether the particular procedure used by the
defendant is medically acceptable in the relevant medical
community.” 246 When the individual experts inevitably disagree, the
jury determines which experts to believe—but the inquiry is what the
medical custom is, not what is medically advisable. 247

243. 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 80, § 3:17 (“[T]he standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt applies to each element of the crime but not to each and every piece of evidence
offered to prove an element.”).
244. See, e.g., Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 513–15, 523 (“The trial judge’s refusal to allow the jury to
[determine an element of the charged crime] infringed [on the defendant’s] right [to have a jury
determine his guilt].”).
245. Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1164 (1942).
246. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 296 (2d ed.
2021).
247. Id.
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Debates and exceptions surrounding the custom rule also reflect
many of the concerns that surround the Consensus Rule. For example,
the appropriateness of deferring to custom is constantly a source of
conflict. Some jurisdictions have recently shifted toward a
nondeferential “reasonable doctor” standard, 248 and the (in)famous case
of Helling v. Carey, in which the Washington Supreme Court tried to
reform screening practices for glaucoma, illustrates nondeferential
judicial behavior along with its dangers. 249 One might even classify the
court-based development of informed consent doctrine in opposition to
then-existing medical practice as a recognition that experts are owed no
deference on value judgments. 250
b. False Advertising
Another area featuring deference similar to the Consensus Rule
is false advertising. In Brown v. GNC Corp., the Fourth Circuit held
that under various state laws, in order to recover for false advertising,
the plaintiff must show that all reasonable experts in the field agree
that the defendant’s representations were false. 251 This rule is notably
nontraditional in that it does not ask for the factfinder’s independent
judgment on the merits, but rather seems to defer to expert judgment.
Criticism of the Fourth Circuit’s rule has fallen along predictable
lines. In an amicus brief supporting plaintiff’s motion for rehearing, a
group of law professors argued that literal falsity was a matter for the
jury, not experts, and that the case should not be dismissed “before

248. Id. § 294 (“A number of courts have now said or implied that the standard of care for
health care providers is the reasonable care standard applied in negligence law generally.”); see
also Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 180–85 (2000) (detailing a shift in the law).
249. 519 P.2d 981, 982–83 (Wash. 1974); see also D. Clay Kelly & Gina Manguno-Mire,
Commentary, Helling v. Carey, Caveat Medicus, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 307 (2008)
(“[Using the glaucoma test at issue in Helling] on persons under 40 result[s] in a high rate of falsepositive results. . . . Subsequent research has consistently demonstrated that . . . the result has
been an increase in the cost of care without a commensurate reduction in morbidity.” (footnotes
omitted)). Judge Hand’s famous decision in The T.J. Hooper is of course the manifesto on
independence over deference to expertise:
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and
available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that
even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
250. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf. supra Section II.A
(discussing value-laden questions).
251. Brown v. GNC Corp. (In re GNC Corp.), 789 F.3d 505, 515–17 (4th Cir. 2015).
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anyone evaluates the competing expert opinions.” 252 One need not take
a stance here on this controversy—after all, given that truth in
advertising is about consumer protection, it is not at all clear that
deference to experts is appropriate in this context. The point, however,
is that once again, deference is not alien to the legal system, but rather
occupies a familiar place in tension with independent jury
decisionmaking.
c. Patents
Patents too feature a mental construct that suggests deference
to an expert community. Patent law, in determining the patentability
requirement of nonobviousness, references a “person having ordinary
skill in the art,” often referred to as a “PHOSITA.” 253 In order for a
patent to be valid, the invention claimed must be nonobvious not to the
jury or a judge, but to a PHOSITA. 254
Further reflection suggests that the PHOSITA is just a stand-in
for the expert community. Patents typically involve factual inquiries in
areas involving significant expertise, and the law does not want lay
decisionmakers exercising independent judgment on the obviousness of
a patent. Instead, patent law asks the factfinder to defer to what the
expert community would say about the patent’s obviousness. 255
Interestingly, Rebecca Eisenberg has observed that the Federal
Circuit and lower courts in practice have drifted away from the
PHOSITA construct in determining obviousness. The courts instead
choose to focus on the written literature, choosing to determine
obviousness as a matter of law themselves. 256 As Eisenberg argues,
however, “[a]ctive practitioners of a technology bring more to a problem
than may be found in written prior art, including training, judgment,
intuition, and tacit knowledge.” 257 This criticism has some parallels
with the problem with Daubert in toxic torts, which encourages lay
decisionmakers to consider scientific studies independently, rather
than tapping the more holistic and nuanced judgments of the expert
community.
252. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Petition for
Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc, and in the Alternative, for Modification of Opinion and
Judgment at 2, In re GNC Corp. 789 F.3d 505 (No. 14-1724).
253. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
254. Id.
255. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of
PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 886 (2004) (noting there is no need to incentivize
advances that are obvious to experts in the field).
256. Id. at 889.
257. Id. at 897.
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d. Parentage (Historical)
The last example involves the historical use of blood tests for
determining paternity. Given the way blood type is genetically
transmitted, in some cases it is possible to conclusively exclude a person
as a child’s genetic father. 258 However, in several high-profile cases—
most notably one involving Charlie Chaplin—juries found paternity in
the face of such tests, and appellate courts upheld them. 259 The ensuing
outcry resulted in the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity (“UABT”), which stated:
Section 4. Effect of Test Results. If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts,
as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the
father of the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts
disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the
evidence. 260

The UABT remains the law in several states today, although DNA
testing has largely superseded it. 261
The UABT again demonstrates that deference to science is not
foreign or alien to the legal system. The debates over paternity tests
illustrate the continuing tension between independent factfinding and
deference to expertise. The appellate courts who upheld those jury
findings of paternity worried deeply about contradicting established
science, yet ultimately defended the jury’s prerogative. 262 The
commissioners that promulgated the Uniform Act and the legislatures
that ultimately adopted it clearly thought differently.
258. The genes for A and B are codominant, while the gene for O is recessive. Thus, for
example, someone with A blood type has a genotype of either AA or AO, whereas someone with O
blood type must have genotype OO. If a child is type B, and the mother is type A, a man who is
type O cannot be the child’s genetic father. ABO Blood Groups: Predicting the Blood Type of Your
ARIZ.
BIOLOGY
PROJECT
(Aug.
26,
1997),
Children,
UNIV.
biology.arizona.edu/human_bio/ABO_Crosses.html [https://perma.cc/Y4W6-XSWM].
259. Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442, 451–52 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (stating that blood tests
were “not conclusive evidence”); Jordan v. Davis, 57 A.2d 209, 210–11 (Me. 1948).
260. UNIF. ACT ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY § 4 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE L. 1952); see also NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L., PROCEEDINGS IN
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE: UNIFORM BLOOD TESTS AS EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY ACT 1, 2–3 (Sept.
14, 1951) [hereinafter COMM. PROCEEDINGS] (describing the concerns created by the Chaplin case).
261. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:397.3 (2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 522:4 (2021); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.258 (2021); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104 (2021). Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 7554 (West
2016) (containing the Uniform Act on Blood Tests), with CAL. FAM. CODE § 7554 (West 2019)
(replacing discussion of blood testing with genetic testing).
262. E.g., Jordan, 57 A.2d at 210:
[We do not] propose to lay down as a rule of law that the triers of fact may reject what
science says is true; for to do so would be to invite at some future time a conflict between
scientific truth and stare decisis and in that contest the result could never be in
doubt. . . . But the application of scientific principles to the facts of a particular
case . . . still remains the province of the court.
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In some ways, the UABT represents a more extreme application
of the Consensus Rule. It requires unanimity among the experts and
elevates the test conclusion to a matter of law, which perhaps makes it
more akin to judicial notice. 263 Nonetheless, the widespread use and
acceptance of blood typing tests along with the simplicity of the
paternity inference makes such demands easy to meet. 264 The
Consensus Rule may thus be an extension of the ideas in the UABT, but
only slightly so. 265
V. IMPLEMENTATION EXAMPLES
Throughout our theoretical discussion about the Consensus
Rule, there have been hints about how it would apply in specific
situations. This Part brings everything together and briefly illustrates
the use of the Consensus Rule in three contexts.
A. Toxic Torts
Perhaps the most straightforward context is proof of general
causation in toxic torts. Indeed, this article has used toxic torts as its
implicit example throughout, so we will only briefly review this context.
Under the Consensus Rule, experts no longer offer their personal
opinions on causation or teach the jury how to assess the underlying
studies. Instead, their testimony focuses on what the expert community
as a whole believes about causation. If consensus statements or metaanalyses exist, then the parties will surely rely heavily on them. At the
same time, judges do not gatekeep the substantive reliability of the
scientific studies as they do under Daubert. Judges may of course check
whether the testifying experts are adequately familiar with the
relevant expert community, but otherwise all of the evidence on
community belief goes to the jury, who is epistemically competent to
assess it.
Even when no expert consensus exists, the Consensus Rule still
achieves an important shift in perspective. Since the attorneys and
experts make deference-type arguments, the jury picks from positions
prevalent among members of the expert community, rather than
263. See A. Frederick Harris, Some Observations on the Un-Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity, 9 VILL. L. REV. 59, 68 (1963) (characterizing the Uniform Act as creating
judicial notice for these tests, even though “these are not traditional judicial notice situations”).
264. Cf. Ross v. Marx, 90 A.2d 545, 546 (N.J. Essex Cnty. Ct. 1952) (“For a court to declare
that these tests are not conclusive would be as unrealistic as it would be for a court to declare that
the world is flat.”), aff’d, 93 A.2d 597 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
265. In debating the UABT, the commissioners also worried about the problem of faulty tests.
COMM. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 260, at 6–8.
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deferring to an individual expert or striking off on its own. The resulting
outcomes are therefore more defensible and less likely to go astray.
Motions practice also becomes more honest. The Consensus Rule
eliminates disingenuous Daubert motions trying to assert what
evidence is reliable and what is not. Instead, sufficiency motions take
issues away from juries only when no reasonable jury could conclude
that the scientific community believed otherwise. Even more
importantly, appellate courts review that determination de novo, and if
the consensus is obvious, then the appellate court can set precedent,
creating efficiencies for future cases. That precedent is subject to future
overruling if the consensus changes. 266
B. Social Science Facts
A growing feature in modern litigation is the use of social science
evidence to provide background or contextual information. For example,
a party may wish to offer a psychologist to discuss the unreliability of
certain types of eyewitness identification. 267 The Consensus Rule
provides a convenient structure for incorporating this information into
a case. If the relevant expert community has established certain social
scientific facts, then the Consensus Rule asks the factfinder to treat
those facts as established. For example, psychological studies have long
shown that witness confidence is not correlated with reliability, and
that cross-racial identifications are less reliable than intraracial
identifications. 268 Under the Consensus Rule, a jury would take these
facts as given.
In a sense, this result mirrors what some courts have ultimately
done in the eyewitness reliability context. For example, in State v.
Henderson, 269 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that trial courts
should provide enhanced instructions informing jurors about the
dangers of eyewitness identification based on the available social

266. One may worry about the stickiness of precedent, but, given that scientific consensus once
established tends to change slowly, the timetables between law and science may not differ too
much on average. See Ben K. Grunwald, Suboptimal Social Science and Judicial Precedent, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 1409, 1434 (2013) (“[T]he slow evolution of social science knowledge sharply limits
the need to revise precedent frequently.”).
267. E.g., State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 715 (Conn. 2012) (holding that such testimony does
not invade the province of the jury).
268. E.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 934, 942 (1984).
269. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
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science. 270 What the Henderson court did in a pathbreaking opinion,
however, is accomplished by the Consensus Rule as a matter of course.
Notably, the jury remains free to do what it likes with the
available social science. In the main, the social science literature only
makes claims at the general population level. Social scientists do not
claim to be able to determine the reliability of a specific eyewitness
identification. As such, the question whether a particular witness is
reliable is appropriately left to the jury, since there is no scientific
consensus on that question.
Finally, the ability of courts to establish precedents recognizing
generally accepted social scientific truths under the Consensus Rule
parallels John Monahan and Laurens Walker’s insightful proposal
regarding social frameworks. 271 They argue that courts should treat
general social science facts such as the reliability of eyewitness
identification like legal precedent. 272 The Consensus Rule conceptually
approaches the problem in a far different way, but the net effect, once
there is a consensus, is nearly the same.
C. Forensic Science
One of the most controversial applications of the Consensus Rule
may be the forensics context. In recent times, commentators have
harshly criticized the forensics community for failing to develop reliable
and scientifically defensible forensic techniques. 273 The Consensus Rule
seems to defer to these much maligned expert communities, rather than
providing an engine for reform. Yet, much as reformers might not like
its slow-moving conservatism, we can strongly argue that the way the
Consensus Rule handles the forensics problem is correct. To see this,
we need to break down the issue of forensic reliability into its several
eras.
1. Pre-criticism Period
The Consensus Rule would have done little to stop the historical
use of forensics in courts. In the absence of an active controversy, the
relevant expert community’s beliefs control, and so handwriting,
fingerprinting, and even bitemark experts would have gone historically
270. Id. at 924–25 (charging committee to develop model jury instructions on eyewitness
identifications).
271. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science
in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 560 (1987).
272. Id. at 585–87.
273. See, e.g., Faigman et al., supra note 231, at 438.
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unchecked. But to criticize the Consensus Rule on this ground would
amount to hindsight bias. For one thing, none of the then-existing
admissibility frameworks did any better. For another, it is not clear that
courts can be blamed for an issue (forensic unreliability) that no one
knew about at the time. Courts are not equipped to do research, nor are
lawyers equipped to find scientific flaws. If the blame rests with anyone,
it rests with the relevant expert communities, or perhaps researchers
from related fields who did not sound the alarm sooner.
2. Early Criticism
The Consensus Rule would also have ignored early pathbreaking
criticism of the forensic community. For example, Michael Risinger,
Michael Saks, and Mark Denbeaux’s classic 1989 article criticizing
forensic document examination would have been insufficient to cause
the Consensus Rule to start rejecting handwriting experts. 274 This
result is more troubling, but arguably not much more so. To start, with
the exception of extraordinary cases, 275 the full Daubert framework has
done little better in practice. While Daubert’s nondeferential posture
theoretically offers greater opportunities for successful challenges, in
reality it has not. Indeed, laments about the lack of rigorous
gatekeeping in forensics are now a popular handwringing exercise. 276
It is also entirely unclear why we should prefer a different result.
As this Article has stressed repeatedly, as lay decisionmakers, judges
cannot tell whether the critics are correct. Risinger and his colleagues
were after all law and psychology professors and not handwriting
examiners. 277 External criticism is doubtless important for sparking
changes in long-entrenched fields, but outside critics can also miss
important operational or practical considerations. History may have
shown us that they were right, but mavericks are not always, so
prudence suggests that courts should wait for the movement to build.
3. Emerging New Consensus
What is the current situation surrounding forensic analyses like
handwriting? Arguably, it is dissensus with an emerging new
274. See Risinger et al., supra note 10, at 780 (stating that “[a] lot of unvalidated nonsense is
allowed into court”).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67–68 (D. Mass. 1999) (limiting the
testimony of the handwriting expert).
276. See, e.g., Aliza B. Kaplan & Janis C. Puracal, It’s Not a Match: Why the Law Can’t Let Go
of Junk Science, 81 ALB. L. REV. 895, 926–27 (2017) (describing the courts’ failure to reject forensic
evidence).
277. Risinger et al., supra note 10, at 731.
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consensus. Although dissensus probably occurred prior to its release,
the 2009 National Research Council (“NRC”) report questioning the
practices of the forensic community proclaimed an active controversy in
this area. 278 The 2016 report of the President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (“PCAST”) further confirmed it. 279 In this case,
the split arose externally, with members of the broader scientific
community raising objections to the methods used by traditionalists.
But regardless, under the Consensus Rule, the traditional forensic
community is therefore no longer entitled to deference from the
courts. 280
There are also facets of an emerging new consensus. To the
extent that certain forensic communities have begun to adopt
recommendations from the NRC and PCAST reports and have
incorporated them into their accreditation standards, those standards
are now part of what the relevant expert community does. Analyses
done in accord with those accreditation standards represent the views
of the community and are entitled to deference; analyses not done in
accord with those standards are not.
Is this enough? Should not the courts simply exclude traditional
forensic evidence? For now, the Consensus Rule suggests no. Just
because many in the evidence community think that the criticisms are
right does not mean that we necessarily want judges to choose between
the expert communities. In the absence of consensus, the decision is the
jury’s. The task of reformers remains to persuade and convince the
forensic community of their position. The court’s job under the
Consensus Rule is not to police the truth of expert conclusions; the
court’s job is to determine what the relevant experts think.
CONCLUSION
Founded on good intentions but unrealistic expectations, the
Daubert framework should be scrapped. It invites dilettantism, asking
lay judges and jurors to learn just enough about an area of expertise in
278. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 224, at 4–9.
279. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON
METHODS
1,
45
(Sept.
2016),
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_r
eport_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AP8-28JL].
280. In practice, courts may face disputes about whether a particular external group is a
relevant expert community. Resolving that kind of dispute again requires judgment and would
have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. One suspects, however, that regardless of their
original source, valid criticisms will over time persuade a growing faction of in-group members.
Once that minority becomes large enough, courts can take notice.
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a short period of time to be dangerous. It focuses on individual experts,
who in an adversarial system inevitably disagree and generate the
expert paradox. And it entertains maverick ideas—in the hollow hope
of getting things right, but at considerable risk of getting things wrong.
Long before Daubert gatekeeping, the evidence scholar Edmund
Morgan argued that two factors should influence the formation of
evidence rules: (i) the “competence or lack of competence of the
tribunal”; and (ii) “the means by which and the extent to which sources
of information are made available to it.” 281 In this Article, I have tried
to follow Morgan’s sage advice in developing the Consensus Rule. The
Consensus Rule confronts the age-old problem of lay decisionmakers
who must answer questions involving expertise. It also recognizes that
the most reliable source of information is the expert community, not
individual experts, and certainly not the independent judgments of the
lay decisionmakers. The answer to the expert evidence problem is to
abandon the gatekeeping approach of Daubert and to adopt the
inference rule approach of the Consensus Rule. If the relevant expert
community believes a specialized fact, then the factfinder should
proceed accordingly. That inference rule acknowledges the limitations
and constraints under which the legal system operates and takes
advantage of the specialization and expertise that makes the rest of
society successful.
Developing and proposing the Consensus Rule as an alternative
to Daubert, however, is only the beginning. Looking forward, we need
additional research on several empirical questions raised in this Article.
One question is whether judges and jurors, despite the formal Daubert
framework, already impose something akin to the Consensus Rule in
practice out of necessity. 282 Studies show that “general acceptance”
predicts Daubert decisions by judges 283 and influences lay belief on
scientific questions. 284 Might the Consensus Rule actually better
describe the law in practice than Daubert?

281. Morgan, supra note 80, at 248.
282. Thanks to Judge John Lee for suggesting this idea. See Dan M. Kahan, Hank JenkinsSmith & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RSCH. 147, 149
(2011) (hoping that “the need . . . for expert guidance would cause [laypersons] to gravitate toward
the consensus positions among scientists”).
283. See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT
EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION 41–45 (2001),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1439.html
[https://perma.cc/XL2Y-BTL5]
(showing general acceptance’s correlation to admissibility); see also Gatowski et al., supra note 29,
at 444–48 (reporting survey in which judges best understood general acceptance among the
Daubert factors, and many said they would give it the most weight).
284. See Johnson, supra note 193, at 606–07.
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Another question is what in fact is the best strategy for a
layperson making decisions involving expert knowledge. Recall that
Part II reasoned that the best strategy was likely deference to the
expert community. Good reasoning may lead to good outcomes most of
the time—an assumption dubbed the Aristotelian Principle 285—so in
the absence of empirical evidence, good reasoning is a safe bet. But it
would be nice to have some confirmatory evidence, perhaps through a
future vignette study, that a deference approach is empirically superior
to an education one. 286
Beyond empirical questions, our discussion of the Consensus
Rule also raises several important theoretical questions for the future.
The Consensus Rule is a rule of inference, not a rule of admissibility.
Rather than primarily focusing on admissibility rules, as it long has,
should evidence law focus on alternative ways to improve inference and
factfinding?
More broadly, can we apply the lessons of the Consensus Rule,
which we developed for the legal context, to how laypersons generally
interact with scientific and expert knowledge? In our everyday
interactions with experts—when we seek medical care, car and home
repair, financial planning, and even information for voting on policy
questions—can the Consensus Rule help? For each context, the stakes
and the constraints will differ, so the specific details may change. But
the Consensus Rule suggests that the fundamental question should
remain the same: How would the relevant expert community answer
this question?
285. MICHAEL A. BISHOP & J.D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN
JUDGMENT 20 (2005) (“The Aristotelian Principle says simply that in the long run, poor reasoning
tends to lead to worse outcomes than good reasoning. So the Aristotelian Principle allows us to
empirically determine—though not with complete certainty—when one way of reasoning is better
than another.”).
286. The psychological literature on “transformative experiences,” a philosophical problem
made famous in L.A. PAUL, TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCE 17 (2014), may suggest the superiority
of deference over education. We can pose the paradoxical question in the following way: We would
like to decide whether to undergo a transformative experience. The problem is that because it is
“transformative,” by definition we cannot imagine what the outcome of that experience will be like.
Id. at 17 (explaining how one “cannot rationally choose to have the experience” nor “to avoid it, to
the extent that [one’s] choice is based on [their] assessments of what the experience would be like”).
So how do we decide? The answer may be to rely on the reports of others who have undergone the
experience. Psychologists have shown that relying on such reports is a better predictor of outcomes
than trying to imagine the outcome independently, and, in accordance with the concerns we raised
about safety valves, those studies further show that using both (reports and independent
imagination) results in worse predictions. See Emma Walsh & Peter Ayton, My Imagination Versus
Your Feelings: Can Personal Affective Forecasts Be Improved by Knowing Other People’s
Emotions?, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 351, 359 (2009); see also Daniel T. Gilbert, Matthew A.
Killingsworth, Rebecca N. Eyre & Timothy D. Wilson, The Surprising Power of Neighborly Advice,
323 SCIENCE 1617, 1619 (2009) (showing that a peer’s report about an outcome is more predictive
than an individual’s own prediction).
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Whether in court or in everyday life, the Consensus Rule teaches
important lessons: The need for intellectual humility and the
limitations of our nonexpert judgment on factual questions; the
importance of not deferring on value-laden questions; the need to trust
experts as a source of information, but only as representatives of a
broader expert community. Specialization and expertise lie at the core
of modern society, and so we will often be both the layperson and the
confused and overwhelmed decisionmaker. The Consensus Rule makes
that unenviable yet inevitable position just a bit less daunting.

